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COMMENT
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the
University of Virginia: The Myth of the
Content Neutral Establishment Clause
Mark Daniel Salzberg*
Using public funds for the direct subsidization of preaching
the word is categorically forbidden under the Establishment
Clause, and if the Clause was meant to accomplish nothing
else, it was meant to bar this use of public money.'
INTRODUCTION
In Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Vir-
ginia,2 the University of Virginia ("University") provided the back-
drop for a battle of Constitutional proportions.3 On one hand, the
University's attempt to maintain a separation of church and State
reflected the struggle against state establishment of religion, person-
ified by the University's founder, Thomas Jefferson.4 On the other
* J.D. Candidate, 1996, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank
Professors Martin S. Flaherty, Abner S. Greene, Robert J. Kaczorowski, and Russell G.
Pearce for their advice and guidance on the preparation of this Comment. This Comment
is dedicated to my family for their constant love, support and encouragement.
1. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2535
(1995) (Souter, J., dissenting).
2. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
3. See Note, The Supreme Court, 1994 Term-Leading Cases, 109 HARV. L. REV. 10,
210 (1995) [hereinafter Viewpoint Discrimination] ('The [University] served as the battle-
ground for the latest conflict between two mighty constitutional titans: the Free Speech
and the Establishment Clauses.").
4. See, e.g., Michael J. McManus, Religious Freedom Case Heard in Court, FRESNO
BEE, Mar. 4, 1995, at A13 ("Over the august, high-ceilinged chamber of the U.S. Su-
preme Court this week, the ghost of Thomas Jefferson hovered. A few blocks away..
• are his word's from Virginia's Act Establishing Religious Freedom ...."). The third
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hand, the petitioners' challenge of a government policy which de-
nied benefits based on a speaker's message embodied the principles
which culminated in the fight to secure free expression.5 In decid-
President's gravestone, standing on a hill in nearby Monticello, commemorated his role
as founder of the University, and author of both the Declaration of Independence and
Virginia's Act Establishing Religious Freedom. See VA. CODE ANN. § 57-1 (Michie
1995); see also Craig Peyton Gaumer, Punishment for Prejudice: A Commentary on the
Constitutionality and Utility of State Statutory Responses to the Problem of Hate Crimes,.
39 S.D. L. REV. 1, 28 n.170 (1994) (citations omitted) (describing the epithets on Jeffer-
son's gravestone); Justice William H. Rehnquist, Thomas Jefferson and His Contemporar-
ies, 9 J.L. & POL. 595 .(1993) (discussing Jefferson).
Jefferson made clear his desire that the University allow religious groups access to
University facilities without granting direct aid to their attempts to promote a religious
message. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Doctor Thomas Cooper, Nov. 2, 1822, reprint-
ed in JEFFERSON: MAGNIFICENT POPULIST (Martin A. Larson, ed. 1984) (cited with
approval in BriefAmicus Curiae of Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
American Jewish Committee, and Anti-Defamation League, in Support of Respondents
at 21-22, Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995)
(No. 94-329) [hereinafter Amicus Brief]). In a letter, Jefferson wrote:
In our annual report to the legislature, after stating the constitutional reasons
against a public establishment of any religious instruction, we suggest the expe-
diency of encouraging the different religious sects to establish, each for itself,
a professorship of their own tenets, on the confines of the university, so near
as that their students may attend the lectures there, and have free use of our
library, and every other accommodation we can give them; preserving, however,
their independence of us and of each other.
Id. (emphases added). It seems that nearly all Establishment Clause battles lead to the
invocation of Jefferson's name. See, e.g., William Van Alstyne, Comment, Trends in the
Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall-A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly,
1984 DUKE L.J. 770, 787 (1984) ("I do not know whether Mr. Jefferson would have been
surprised, but I believe he would have been disappointed.").
5. See, e.g., Religious Liberty: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the Judi-
ciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 12, 1995) (statement of Ronald W. Rosenberger)
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library ALLNEWS file. Rosenberger noted:
When I started at the [University] . . . I expected to find a great forum for
debate. I imagined myself sitting on the grass of Mr. Jefferson's historic Lawn
having philosophical discussions about the meaning of life, the best forms of
government .... And this did happen. I found that students had even orga-
nized themselves into hundreds of extracurricular organizations according to
their varying interests.
I also found, however, that these student groups were not always treated
equitably . . . . I found that some viewpoints and perspectives were barred
from setting up a booth in the marketplace of ideas due to a misunderstanding
of what the First Amendment requires.
Id.; see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
[Vol. 6:871
ESTABLISHMENT CLA USE
ing Rosenberger the Supreme Court was thus forced to construct
a hierarchy among two First Amendment rights: the Free Speech
Clause 6 and the Establishment Clause.7
The petitioner, Ronald Rosenberger, was a student at the Uni-
versity who helped form an organization named Wide Awake Pro-
ductions ("WAP").8 WAP's members were University students
who believed that none of the student-run publications provided a
forum for their viewpoint; accordingly, WAP's editors published a
journal to inject their perspective into the campus-wide debate.9
WAP published three issues and distributed 5,000 copies of each
issue to the University's students, free of charge. 0 In order to
offset the cost of publishing, WAP sought funding from the Uni-
versity's Student Activities' Fund ("SAF")." WAP's members,
following standard procedure under the SAF's guidelines, submitted
a budget request and awaited approval.12 After a lengthy process,
however, the University denied the funding.' 3
The University based its decision on the journal's content. 4 It
examined WAP's publication, Wide Awake: A Christian Perspec-
tive at the University of Virginia ("Wide Awake") and found that
the journal contained an invocation of religious-specifically Chris-
tian--themes. 5 In particular, the school noted that WAP's mem-
("Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make
men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government the deliberative forces
should prevail over the arbitrary.").
6. - U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press ....").
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion .... "); see also Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2525 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
('This case lies at the intersection of the principle of government neutrality and the
prohibition on state funding of religious activities.").
8. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2515.
9. Brief for the Petitioners at 6, Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of
Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995) (No. 94-329) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief].
10. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269, 272 (4th Cir.
1994).
11. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2515.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14, Id.
15. Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 272; see also Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2534-35
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bers created Wide Awake to "challenge Christians to live in word
and deed according to the faith they proclaim."' 6 The University
thus concluded that underwriting Wide Awake would constitute
direct funding of a religious message. 7 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, had previously interpreted the Establishment Clause to prohib-
it the government from directly funding a religious entity. 8 Conse-
quently, the University denied the request and Rosenberger, as a
member of WAP, brought suit in federal court.' 9
Rosenberger based his petition on the Free Speech Clause.2 °
He posited that the University could not refuse funding to an other-
wise eligible student organization on the basis of the group's view-
point.2' He further noted that the Supreme Court had prohibited
the government from making decisions based on the content of a
speaker's message.22 Consequently, he argued that the University's
denial of funding discriminated against WAP's members solely due
to their religious viewpoint.23 He suggested that WAP, as a student
organization, could receive University funding because the SAF
(Souter, J., dissenting) (examining the contents of Wide Awake and finding it to be "the
straightforward exhortation to enter into a relationship with G-d as revealed in Jesus
Christ .... ") (alteration added).
16. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2534 (citations omitted).
17. Id. at 2515; see also Amicus Brief at 1 (arguing that "AT A FUNDAMENTAL
LEVEL, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE PROHIBITS GOVERNMENT FUNDING
OF RELIGIOUS SPEECH AND EXHORTATION").
18. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Ed. of the Township of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16
(1947) ("The 'establishment of religion' clause ... means at least this .... No tax in
any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions
... to teach or practice religion.").
19. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2515-16.
20. See Petitioner's Brief at 15 (arguing that "THE SPEECH AND PRESS CLAUS-
ES FORBID A PUBLIC UNIVERSITY FROM DENYING FUNDING TO AN OTHER-
WISE ELIGIBLE STUDENT PUBLICATION SOLELY BECAUSE OF ITS RELIGIOUS
VIEWPOINT").
21. See, e.g., Petitioner's Brief at 2 ("This case involves the refusal of the [Universi-
ty] to subsidize the printing costs of a student publication, called [Wide Awake], solely
and expressly because the viewpoint articulated in the publication is religious.").
22. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992) (holding that the
government may not regulate speech based on "hostility-or favoritism-towards the
underlying message expressed").
23. See Petitioner's Brief at 2.
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distributed aid through a neutral government entitlement program;"
WAP qualified for state aid as a student organization, regardless of
its religious viewpoint.2"
The federal courts thus faced a conundrum: the University was
required to obey the Establishment Clause which guaranteed the
separation of church and State, but was prohibited from analyzing
a student organization's message to ensure that SAF funding did
not underwrite religion. 6 Broadly, Rosenberger's suit was a battle
between two clauses within the First Amendment. 27 Both the dis-
trict court28 and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 29 ruled that the
Establishment Clause-and not the Free Speech Clause-was the
controlling doctrine and upheld the University's determination.3 °
The Supreme Court, however, agreed with Rosenberger and applied
the Free Speech Clause to prohibit the University from making
such content based distinctions.3 In so doing, the Court treated
24. A neutral government entitlement program is created by the government, without
reference to religion, in order to aid the general public. See Thomas R. McCoy, A Coher-
ent Methodology for the First Amendment Speech and Religion Clause Cases, 48 VAND.
L. REv. 1335, 1340-41 (1995). Neutral government programs, although designed to
promote secular objectives, often overlap with religious organizations when religious
groups seek inclusion in order to procure funding from the program. Id. at 1340-43;
accord Michael W. McConnell, "G-d is Dead and We Have Killed Him!:" Freedom of
Religion in the Post-Modern Age, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 163, 177 (1993) (alteration added
in title) ("With the rise of the welfare-regulatory state, the spheres of religion and govern-
ment were no longer distant and distinct ... the state extended its regulatory jurisdiction
over broad aspects of life that formerly had been private and frequently religious .... ).
25. Petitioner's Brief at 22 (arguing that "THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE DOES
NOT BAR RELIGIOUS SPEAKERS AND PUBLICATIONS FROM PARTICIPATING
IN PUBLIC BENEFITS ON AN EQUAL AND NONDISCRIMINATORY BASIS.").
26. See McCoy, supra note 24, at 1342-43.
27. Viewpoint Discrimination, supra note 3, at 210 (arguing that the Rosenberger
controversy involved both the Free Speech Clause and the Establishment Clause). But
see Luba L. Shur, Content-Based Distinctions in a University Funding System and the
Irrelevance of the Establishment Clause: Putting Wide Awake to Rest, 81 VA. L. REV.
1665, 1720 (1995) ("The Establishment Clause is Rosenberger's red herring. The battle
at rock bottom does not hinge on church/state relations, but on whether the judiciary can
displace a university's academic judgments at the request of ... discontents .... ).
28. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 795 F. Supp. 175 (W.D.
Va. 1992).
29. Rosenberger, 18 F.3d 269.
30. Rosenberger, 795 F. Supp. at 183-84; 18 F.3d at 287-88.
31. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2516-17.
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religion as a viewpoint like any other.32 Consequently, the Court
ruled that the University had violated WAP's members' Free
Speech rights and could no longer exclude such religious view-
points from the SAF's neutral entitlement program.33
The Rosenberger decision both legitimizes and ensures govern-
ment sponsorship of religious proselytization.34 Although the Court
merely struck down a public university's funding guidelines, in a
larger sense, Rosenberger undermines the fundamental protections
afforded by the Establishment Clause. 35 Federal 36 and state37 regu-
lations, such as those promulgated by the University, treat funding
differently depending on whether the recipient is a religious or a
secular organization.38 Although Rosenberger claimed that Wide
32. See id. at 2517-18; cf. Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion
Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611, 1616-19 (1993) (arguing that religious belief is different
than its secular counterpart); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1995
SUP. CT. REV. 1, 15 (1995) (arguing that religious claims "differ from secular moral
claims both because the state is constitutionally disabled from disputing the truth of the
religious claim and because it cannot categorically deny the authority on which such a
claim rests").
33. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2516-20. The Court ruled that the government could
not exclude religious organizations from participating in such programs as long as the
program was designed to neither help nor hinder religion. Id. at 2521-22.
34. The verb "proselytize" is defined as "to induce someone to convert to one's
faith" or "to recruit someone to join one's party, institution or cause .... " MERRIAM
WEBSTER DICTIONARY 586 (1994); see also Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2533 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) ('The Court today, for the first time, approves the direct funding of core.
religious activities by an arm of the State.").
35. As one commentator explained:
[T]he negative bar against establishment of religion implies the affirmative
"establishment" of a civil order for the resolution of public moral disputes.
Agreement on such a secular mechanism was the price of ending the war of all
sects against all. Establishment of a civil public order was the social contract
produced by religious truce.
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 197
(1992).
36. See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. §§ 2301.5(d)(2)(xvi), 2301.22(d) (1994) (Federal Communi-
cations Commission's regulations barring funding for sectarian programming). See gener-
ally Fordham Univ. v. Brown, 856 F. Supp. 684 (D.D.C. 1994) (a Catholic University
sued Commerce Department for refusal to fund radio tower construction on the ground
that public regulations forbid subsidies to sectarian entities).
37. See, e.g., Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 271 n.2 (the University, an arm of the state of
Virginia, has guidelines which prohibit funding for religious activities).
38. See, e.g., id. at 286 ("Direct monetary subsidization of religious organizations and
[Vol. 6:871
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Awake's purpose was merely to ensure a Christian viewpoint in the
campus-wide debate,39 its practical effect was to spread the gos-
pel:40 WAP's members distributed the publication, free of charge,
throughout campus in order "to encourage students to consider
what a personal relationship with Jesus Christ means. 41  WAP's
use of a journal as a medium for expression is constitutionally
significant because it allowed a sectarian organization to "piggy-
back" a religious message on public funds, thus creating the possi-
bility of continued government sponsorship of religious
proselytization.42
This Comment argues that the Supreme Court erred by applying
the Free Speech Clause's content neutral doctrine in Rosenberger.
Moreover, by using such an analysis, the Court fundamentally un-
dermined the protections guaranteed by the Establishment Clause.
Part I discusses the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence through two competing interpretations and precedent. Part
I also examines the Court's development of a content neutral analy-
sis of the Free Speech Clause. Finally, Part I analyzes a line of
"hybrid cases" in which the Court applied both the Free Speech
and Establishment Clauses. Part II discusses the Rosenberger con-
troversy through its various stages of development: at the Univer-
sity, through the federal courts, and to its resolution by the Su-
preme Court. Part III argues that the Rosenberger decision resulted
in sub-silentio changes of Establishment Clause doctrine, and offers
two theories to support the University's decision not to subsidize
Wide Awake. Finally, this Comment concludes that, by breaking
projects, however, is a beast of an entirely different color .... [T]he 'potential for politi-
cal divisiveness related to religious belief and practice' would be aggravated if the Uni-
versity were to fund ... Wide Awake.") (citations omitted).
39. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2515.
40. Id. at 2535 (Souter, J., dissenting) ('The subject is not the discourse of the
scholar's study or the seminar room, but the evangelist's mission station and the pulpit.").
41. Id. at 2534.
42. Cf. id. at 2551 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter concluded:
[M]y apprehension is whetted by Chief Justice Burger's warning in Lemon v.
Kurtzman: "in constitutional adjudication some steps, which when taken were
thought to approach 'the verge,' have become the platform for yet further steps.
A certain momentum develops in constitutional theory and it can be a 'downhill
thrust' easily set in motion but difficult to retard or stop."
id. (citations omitted).
1996]
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new ground in Rosenberger, the Supreme Court has undermined
the Establishment Clause's guarantee of a separation of church and
State which has successfully guarded religious liberty in the United
States for over two hundred years.
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. The Establishment Clause
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion .. .
1. Two Rival Visions of the Establishment Clause:
Separationism and Accommodationism
Two theories" have evolved in the twentieth century to provide
alternate interpretations of the Establishment Clause.45  The first
theory, known as separationism, was advanced by Justice Black in
Everson v. Board of Education. This school of thought, emanat-
43. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1.
44. While numerous judges have proposed their own theories to govern adjudication
of Establishment Clause questions, accommodation and separation are at the theoretical
heart of the debate. See Charles Roth, Rosenberger v. Rector: The First Amendment Dog
Chases Its Tail, 21 J.C. & U.L. 723, 745-49 (1995) (differentiating between
"accommodationism" and "separationism" as strains of thought). These theories operate
at opposite poles, thus allowing judges to find their position between the two. See infra
part II.D.2 (discussing Justice O'Connor's Rosenberger concurrence); Roth, supra, at 749-
50 (delineating alternate tests proposed by Justices Kennedy and O'Connor prior to
Rosenberger).
45. "Although the Establishment Clause's 'opaque' language provides the basis for
church-state separation, the Supreme Court has yet to reach a consensus on howto inter-
pret the language of the Clause itself." John E. Burgess, Recent Development, 47 VAND.
L. REV. 1939, 1957 (1994) (citations omitted). While much of the debate has raged
within the courts, such terms as the "separation of church and state" have become in-
grained in the national consciousness and are debated by lawyers and lay people alike.
See Robert S. Peck, The Threat to the American Idea of Religious Liberty, 46 MERCER
L. REV. 1123, 1127-28 (1995) (describing the Republicans' attempt to propose a school
prayer amendment in order to limit the Supreme Court who had "made G-d unconstitu-
tional") (alteration added); Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing The Establishment Clause: The
Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555 (1991)
("For almost fifty years, judges, constitutional scholars, and informed citizens have been
drawn to the blinkered view that the First Amendment's religion clauses involve the
separation of church and state.").
46. 330 U.S. 1 (1947); see, e.g., J. Woodford Howard Jr., The Robe and the Cloth:
[Vol. 6:871
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ing from the writings of Thomas Jefferson and Roger Williams,47
protects the body politic and religion from one another by creating
separate spheres for the two because "religious societies are most
genuine when their supporters arise from responding hearts and
minds unassisted as well as undeterred by government. 4 8  The
second theory, known as accommodationism, was articulated by
then Associate Justice Rehnquist in his dissenting opinion in
Wallace v. Jaffree.49 Accommodationism holds that the govern-
ment may affirmatively aid religion, and is precluded only from
establishing a national church or favoring one sect over another.5°
a. Separationism
In Everson, the Supreme Court faced a challenge to the Estab-
lishment Clause: whether New Jersey could authorize its local
school districts to subsidize childrens' bus rides to sectarian
schools.51 Justice Black, writing for the majority, interpreted the
Establishment Clause in a way with which even the dissenting
Justices were willing to agree. 52 He began with a historical survey
The Supreme Court and Religion in the United States, 7 J.L. & POL. 481, 494-95 (1991)
(discussing the theme of separationism in Everson).
47. See Howard, supra note 46, at 484 (describing separationism).
48. Carl H. Esbeck, A Restatement of the Supreme Court's Law of Religious Free-
dom: Coherence, Conflict, or Chaos?, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 581, 625 (1995); see
also Steven D. Smith, Separatism and the "Secular": Reconstructing The Disestablish-
ment Decision, 67 TEX. L. REV. 955, 1016 (1989) (The purpose of separationism is to
"protect the state from control or corruption by the church and to guard the church against
control or corruption by the state."). This principle, also known as voluntarism, "comes
from the separationist insistence that an authentic church must be a voluntary church."
Esbeck, supra, at 625.
49. 472 U.S. 38 (1985); see also John Gay, Bowden v. Kendrick: Establishing a
New Relationship Between Church and State, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 953, 954 (1989) (ex-
plaining accommodationism).
50. See Gay, supra note 49, at 956 n.20.
51. Everson, 330 U.S. at 3. Justice Black noted that "[t]hese church schools give
their students . . . regular religious instruction conforming to the religious tenets and
modes of worship of the Catholic Faith." Id. The appellant was a taxpayer who brought
suit under the theory that the reimbursement violated both the Federal and New Jersey
Constitutions. Id. at 3-4. Although the appellant framed a due process issue, Justice
Black explained that he would decide the case on the Establishment Clause question. Id.
at 7-8.
52. LEONARD LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 150-51 (1994). Levy concluded:
The dissenting justices in the Everson case, while disagreeing with the majority
1996]
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of religious persecution both in Europe and in the colonies.5 This
intolerance, Justice Black believed, led many of the Founding Fa-
thers to support the idea that individual liberty would best thrive
"under a government which was stripped of all power to tax, to
support, or otherwise to assist any or all religions ... .54 In fact,
he argued that this principle was the impetus behind James Madi-
son and Thomas Jefferson's fight against a tax to support an estab-
lished church and for adopting the Virginia Bill for Religious Lib-
erty. Justice Black applied this interpretation of the Establishment
Clause to the states through his often quoted statement:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amend-
ment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one reli-
gion over another . . . No tax in any amount, large or
small, can be levied to support any religious activities or
on the question of whether the "wall of separation" had in fact been breached
by the practice at issue, concurred with the majority on the historical question
of the intentions of the framers and the meaning of the establishment clause.
Id.
53. Everson, 330 U.S. at 8-11. Justice Black noted:
With the power of government supporting them, at various times and places,
Catholics had persecuted Protestants, Protestants had persecuted Catholics,
Protestant sects had persecuted other Protestant sects, Catholics of one shade of
belief had persecuted Catholics of another shade of belief, and all of these had
from time to time persecuted the Jews.
Id. at 9.
54. Id. at 11. A commentator wrote, "[the Establishment Clause] protects individuals
from compulsory financial support of other people's religion through the tax system-not
because such support will coerce conversion, but because it will cause profound divisive-
ness and offense." Sullivan, supra note 35, at 209-10.
55. Everson, 330 U.S. at 13 (citations omitted) ("That no man shall be compelled to
frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever. ... ). In
support of the separationist position, Madison wrote his Memorial and Remonstrance in
which he argued that "true religion did not need the support of law; that no person, either
believer or non-believer, should be taxed to support a religious institution of any kind.
..." Id. at 12 (citations omitted). A commentator noted that "Madison wrote of a world
separable into two spheres: the religious and the secular." Ruti Teitel, A Critique of
Religion as Politics in the Public Sphere, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 747, 757-58 (1993) (con-
struing RICHARD BERNSTEIN, ARE WE TO BE A NATION: THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITU-
TION 69 (1987)).
[Vol. 6:871
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institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form
they may adopt to teach or practice religion .... In the
words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of reli-
gion by law was intended to erect a "wall of separation
between church and State.
56
Consequently, a judge's role was to separate government policies
that provide for the general public from those designed to support
religious institutions.57
56. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16 (citations omitted). Justice Black incorporated these
rights through a two-step process: he posited that (1) this understanding of religious
liberty was the proper interpretation of the First Amendment, and (2) the Fourteenth
Amendment applied these rights against the state. Id. at 13-15.
Professor Tribe has noted that there are two fundamental principles underlying this
debate: voluntarism and separationism. LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION-
AL LAW 1160-61 (2d ed. 1988). As applied to the Establishment Clause, voluntarism was
to ensure that "the advancement of a church would come only from the voluntary support
of its followers and not from the political support of the state. Religious groups, it was
believed, should prosper or perish on the intrinsic merit of their beliefs and practices."
Id.; see also Donald A. Gianella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment and Doctrinal
Development, Part II. The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 517
(1968) (describing voluntarism). Working in accord with voluntarism is separationism:
The state should not become involved in religious affairs [and] . . . sectarian
differences should not be allowed unduly to fragment the body politic. Implicit
in this ideal of mutual abstinence was the principle that under no circumstance
should religion be financially supported by public taxation ....
TRIBE, supra,'at 1161. The separation principle thus "operated in both directions; it was
meant to keep religion from entangling with the state as well as to keep churches free
from the state influence that would have been the inevitable concomitant of state financial
support." Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at 777. "Voluntarism, then, was the principle of
personal choice. Separatism was the principle of non-entanglement." Id. at 778. Taken
together, Professor Tribe wrote, these principles form a coherent approach to the religion
clauses. TRIBE, supra, at 1161.
57. Everson, 330 U.S. at 14; see also Laura Underkuffler-Freund, The Separation of
the Religious and the Secular: A Foundational Challenge to First Amendment Theory, 36
WM. & MARY L. REV. 837, 843 (1995) ("Distinctions between the religious and the secu-
lar can surely be made; indeed, such distinctions are assumed if the First Amendment's
Religion Clauses are to have meaning at all."); see also Peck, supra note 45, at 1152
(arguing that the Establishment Clause requires line drawing to determine proselytization
for "when instruction turns to proselyting and imparting knowledge becomes evangelism
is, except in the crudest cases, a subtle inquiry. The difficulty of the inquiry does not,
however, immunize it from judicial scrutiny, for nothing less than the vindication of the
American idea of religious liberty is at stake.") (citations omitted); Greene, supra note 32,
at 1618 ("Barring interpretation of the term 'religion' risks negating the Establishment and
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Justice Black then turned to the New Jersey program. 58  He
explained that while the program helped children reach church
schools (possibly even assisting some who would not have other-
wise attended), State power was neutrally administered as it neither
helped nor handicapped a religious entity.59 He likened the New
Jersey aid program to government services such as police and fire
protection that the State dispensed to both secular and sectarian
institutions. 6° As a result, he believed that the "high and impregna-
ble" wall between church and State had not been breached.6,
Justice Jackson dissented,62 arguing that the separationist under-
tones of the majority's opinion conflicted with its holding which
allowed government support of religious education.63 Justice
Rutledge dissented separately,' 4 stating that the Establishment
Free Exercises Clauses as barriers to government action, for we would have no way of
knowing when such action is legitimate and when it is not.").
58. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16. The New Jersey statute, cited in Everson, authorized
its local school districts to contract for the transportation of school children to and from
school. id. at 3 n.1 (construing N.J. REV. STAT., Cum. Sup., tit. 18, c. 14, § 8). The
appellee township had reimbursed parents for the cost of sending their children to private
schools, both sectarian and secular, on regular buses operated by the local transportation
system. Id. The appellant, a district taxpayer, brought suit challenging the school
Board's practice of reimbursing parochial students' parents. Id. at 3-4.
59. Id. at 17-18.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 18.
62. Id. (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter joined Justice Jackson's dissent.
Id. at 28.
63. Id. at 19. Jackson likened the majority's decision to "Julia who, according to
Byron's reports, 'whispering "I will ne'er consent," consented."' Id. Justice Jackson
believed that the issue could be stated as whether it was "constitutional to tax this com-
plainant to pay the cost of carrying pupils to Church schools of one specified denomina-
tion." ld. at 21. He explained that the function of the church schools was to indoctrinate
the young children as compared with the public schools which were organized around the
principle of strict neutrality towards religion. Id. at 21-24. Justice Jackson therefore felt
that aid to the school was no different than aid to the church itself. Id. at 24. In addition,
he criticized the majority's holding for ignoring the religious test on which the plan
operated. Id. at 24-25. He explained that "[a] policeman protects a Catholic, of
course-but not because he is a Catholic; it is because he is a man and a member of our
society." Id. at 25. The New Jersey program, he explained, only reimbursed Catholic
schools and thus impermissibly favored one religion over all others. Id.
64. Id. at 28. (Rutledge, J., dissenting). Justices Frankfurter, Jackson and Burton
joined Justice Rutledge's dissent. Id.
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Clause's purpose was to "create a complete and permanent separa-
tion of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by com-
prehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support for
religion. '6' He believed that the New Jersey statute breached this
wall because it forced taxpayers to support religion.66
According to Historian Leonard Levy, the Everson Court unani-
mously embraced the separationist view that the Establishment
Clause barred State funding of religious groups, even where the aid
was impartially and equitably administered.67 This analysis autho-
rizes the government to scrutinize all eligible beneficiaries' speech
to ensure that sectarian organizations do not receive State funds;
while Separationists concede that this process, if applied to non-
religious speech, would violate the Free Speech Clause, they argue
that such an "asymmetrical treatment is an unavoidable feature of
the unique demands of the Establishment Clause., 68  Underlying
separationism are thus two coterminous views: (1) religious enti-
65. Id. at 31-32. Justice Rutledge then turned to a number of historical sources
including the debate for religious freedom in Virginia. Id. at 33-34. He determined that
the Establishment Clause "broadly forbids state support, financial or other, of religion in
any guise, form or degree. It outlaws the use of public funds for religious purposes." Id.
at 33.
66. Id. at 44. Justice Rutledge stated:
[T]he test remains undiluted as Jefferson and Madison made it, that money
taken by taxation from one is not to be used or given to support another's
religious training or belief, or indeed one's own. Today as then the furnishing
of "contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbe-
lieves" is the forbidden exaction; and the prohibition is absolute for whatever
measure brings that consequence and whatever amount may be sought or given
to that end.
Id. at 44-45. He explained that the reimbursement, underwritten by citizens of all denom-
inations, helped children get religious training and thus was impermissible. Id. at 45.
67. LEVY, supra note 52, at 151. Levy noted that the sole difference between Justice
Black and the dissenters was determining whether the New Jersey program had breached
the wall. Id. at 150-51.
68. See Sullivan, supra note 35, at 213 (arguing that the Establishment Clause re-
quires the government to scrutinize speech); see also Ruti Teitel, When Separate is Equal:
Why Organized Religious Exercises, Unlike Chess, Do Not Belong in the Public Schools,
81 Nw. U. L. REV. 174, 186 (1986) (arguing that "it is not the role of government to
provide a forum for the interchange of private religious views"); cf. id. at 189 (arguing
that separationists believe that the opposite of religion is anti-religion, while
accommodationists believe that the opposite of religion is non-religion).
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ties must prosper or perish, not through the political support of the
State, but based on the voluntary patronage of its adherents and the
intrinsic merits of their beliefs, 69 and (2) sectarian organizations and
the government must remain independent of one another.70  This
framework divides society into two independent spheres--church
and State-with each operating exclusively within its own do-
main.7'
Until 1985, the Court accepted this interpretation of the Estab-
lishment Clause.72 In 1985, however, Justice Rehnquist struck a
new chord.73
69. See TRIBE, supra note 56, at 1160-61; Robert L. Cord & Howard Ball, The
Separation of Church and State: A Debate, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 895, 910 (1987) (dis-
cussing voluntarism).
70. See TRIBE, supra note 56, at 1161 (describing separation principle).
71. See Esbeck, supra note 48, at 630; see also Developments in the Law-Religion
and the State, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1635-36 (1987) [hereinafter Developments in the
Law] (explaining that separation "would require government and religion to occupy
strictly autonomous spheres, both to protect religion from the 'wilderness of the world'
and to preserve civic unity from sectarian divisiveness") (citations omitted); Ira C. Lupu,
The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230, 249-50 (1994).
72. See, e.g., School Dist. of the City of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 381
(1985) ("No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions.., to teach or practice religion." (citing Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-
16)); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 400 (1983) ("The Establishment Clause of course
extends beyond prohibition of a state church or payment of state funds to one or more
churches."); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) ("[T]he three main evils
against which the Establishment Clause was intended to afford protection: sponsorship,
financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.") (citing
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)).
73. See Lupu, supra note 71, at 238 ("Justice Rehnquist did not persuade a majority
in [Jaffree], but he did succeed in casting doubt on what had been the official history of
the Establishment Clause and in suggesting that an alternative possessed a respectable
claim to historical legitimacy as well."); see also Peck, supra note 45, at 1123 (noting the
rise in accommodationism); Lupu, supra note 45, at 556 ("The constitutional era in which
separationism is the dominant theme appears to be over."). This new view won adherence
by sitting Justices in the 1980s and 1990s (i.e., Rehnquist, Scalia and Kennedy) at roughly
the same time as a new campaign, promoted by those interested in introducing religion
into the public schools, began. See Peck, supra note 45, at 1123. Litigators established
a strategy which sought "to avoid traditional Establishment Clause concerns by emphasiz-
ing the ostensible private status of the religious speaker in a public setting, minimizing
the actual involvement of public authority, and framing the issue as one implicating only
freedom of speech." id. at 1123-24. The Court decided Rosenberger according to this
Free Speech approach. See infra part II.D.1 (the Court's opinion in Rosenberger).
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b. Accommodationism
In 1985, the Supreme Court addressed whether an Alabama
statute authorizing a daily period of silence for meditation or
prayers in public schools violated the Establishment Clause.74 The
Court, in Wallace v. Jaffree,75 held that the state's purpose in enact-
ing the statute was "an effort to return voluntary prayer" to the
public schools.76 The Court explained that the Alabama statute was
a legislative endorsement of religion and thus violated the Estab-
lishment Clause's principle of government neutrality towards reli-
77 78gion. As a result, the Court struck down the statute.
Justice Rehnquist dissented and noted that "[i]t is impossible to
build sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken understanding
of constitutional history, but unfortunately the Establishment Clause
has been expressly freighted with Jefferson's misleading metaphor
for nearly 40 years. '79  Rehnquist thus questioned the prevailing
Establishment Clause interpretation set forth by Justice Black in
Everson.8° He did so in two ways: first, he explained that the
74. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 38, 40 nn.2, 3 (1985) (construing ALA. CODE
§§ 16-1-20.1, 20.2 (Supp. 1984)).
75. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
76. Id. at 56-57.
77. Id. at 60.
78. Id. at 61. Justices Powell and O'Connor both concurred in the judgment, noting
that a moment of silence would pass constitutional muster under the Establishment
Clause. Id. at 66 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 67 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Nothing
in the United States Constitution as interpreted by this Court ... prohibits public school
students from voluntarily praying at any time before, during, or after the schoolday.").
Chief Justice Burger dissented and noted:
The notion that the Alabama statute is a step toward creating an established
church borders on, if it does not trespass into, the ridiculous. The statute does
not remotely threaten religious liberty; it affirmatively furthers the values of
religious freedom and tolerance that the Establishment Clause was designed to
protect .... The statute "endorses" only the view that the religious observanc-
es of others should be tolerated and where possible, accommodated.
Id. at 89-90 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice White also dissented and complimented
Justice Rehnquist on his conception of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 90-91 (White, J.,
dissenting) ("Against [Justice Rehnquist's] history, it would be quite understandable if we
undertook to reassess our cases dealing with ... the Establishment Clause.").
79. Id. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
80. See id. at 91-92; see also supra notes 51-72 and accompanying text (discussing
Everson).
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philosophies of Madison, and not Jefferson, were relevant in adju-
dicating Establishment Clause challenges; and, second, he interpret-
ed Madison's actions and writings in an alternate manner than
Justice Black had.8'
First, Justice Rehnquist minimized Jefferson's influence in the
passage of the Establishment Clause.12 Rehnquist noted that Jeffer-
son was not present for the Bill of Rights' ratification and that his
involvement in the debate surrounding the enactment of the religion
clauses was limited.83  As a result, he explained that Madison's
intent was controlling. 4 Second, Justice Rehnquist emphasized
different portions of Madison's contribution to the church-State de-
bate than Justice Black had.85  Rather than concentrate on Madi-
son's separationist rhetoric, Justice Rehnquist analyzed the Con-
gressional debate over ratification of the Bill of Rights and found
that:
It seems indisputable from these glimpses of Madison's
thinking, as reflected by actions on the floor of the House
in 1789, that he saw the Amendment as designed to prohibit
the establishment of a national religion, and perhaps to pre-
vent discrimination among sects. He did not see it as re-
quiring neutrality on the part of the government between
81. See Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 91-92.
82. See id. at 92.
83. Id. Justice Rehnquist pointed out that:
Thomas Jefferson was of course in France at the time the constitutional Amend-
ments known as the Bill of Rights were passed by Congress and ratified by the
States. His letter to the Danbury Baptist Association was a short note of courte-
sy, written 14 years after the amendments were passed by Congress. He would
seem to any detached observer as a less than ideal source of contemporary
history as to the meaning of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.
Id. But see James M. Dunn, Neutrality and the Establishment Clause in EQUAL SEPARA-
TION 55, 57-58 (Paul J. Weber ed., 1990) ("Is it possible to imagine the gathering that
gave us the First Amendment without the hovering presence of Jefferson?").
84. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 92.
85. Compare Everson, 330 U.S. at 12 (Black, J.) (Madison's writing that "no person,
either believer or non-believer, should be taxed to support a religious institution of any
kind .... ) (citations omitted) with Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 98 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(Madison saw the First Amendment as "designed to prohibit the establishment of a nation-
al religion, and perhaps to prevent discrimination among sects. He did not see it as
requiring neutrality on the part of the government between religion and irreligion.").
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religion and irreligion.8 6
Consequently, Justice Rehnquist asserted that the government could
aid all religions so long as the aid was given evenhandedly and the
government refrained from establishing a national church. 7  To
buttress his viewpoint, Rehnquist located instances in early United
States history where the Government accommodated religion.
88
Justice Rehnquist thus concluded that the "'wall of separation be-
tween church and State' is a metaphor based on bad history, a
metaphor which has proved useless as a guide to judging. It
should be frankly and explicitly abandoned. 8 9
Accommodationists accept Justice Rehnquist's theory and argue
that the government should allow religious entities to participate in
government programs on equal terms with their secular counter-
86. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 98. Justice Rehnquist explained that Madison's more sepa-
ratist views, expressed during the debate leading to the enactment of Virginia's Statute
of Religious Liberty, were not carried "onto the floor of the United States House of
Representatives when he proposed the language which would ultimately become the Bill
of Rights." Id. at 98-99. A commentator noted that "[w]hatever may have been Madi-
son's view of church-state relations in the smaller, homogeneous jurisdiction of Virginia,
the position he took in Congress in propounding an Establishment Clause was based
firmly on the theory of religious pluralism parallel to that espoused in The Federal Pa-
pers." McConnell, supra note 32, at 20. Under this interpretation, Madison believed that
the federal government should encourage a multiplicity of religious factions in order to
prevent one from gaining control; it would not be necessary, therefore, to preclude reli-
gions from receiving state funding so long as the program did not distinguish among
sects. Id. at 19-20
87. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 99.
88. Id. at 99-105 (discussing government encouragement of religion in, for instance,
The Northwest Ordinance, Thanksgiving Proclamations, Indian treaties and education).
Some commentators have noted that "early generations of American statesmen [did not
interpret] the establishment clause as precluding government . . . from using religious
means to achieve secular ends that they thought in the public interest." Cord & Ball,
supra note 69, at 897.
89. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 107. Leonard Levy has proposed that Justice Rehnquist
rephrased Justice Black's famous statement to read:
The establishment of religion clause of the First Amendment means this: Nei-
ther can pass laws which aid one religion or prefer one religion over another.
No tax can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions unless
apportioned in some equitable form and without discrimination in any form or
degree .... The very phrase "wall of separation between Church and State"
is ambiguous and misleading.
LEVY, supra note 52, at 152.
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parts.9° Underlying accommodationism is a willingness to open the
public arena to both secular and religious participants. 91
Accommodationists argue that government should welcome religion
into the "mix of beliefs and associations in the community," and
protect religious opinion equally with its secular counterparts.
92
They believe that State interaction with religious institutions is
legitimate as long as government does not show preferences among
sects.93 Consequently, religious institutions may receive benefits
from generally applicable programs designed to provide aid to
broad classes without reference to religion.94 Although this view
did not persuade a majority in Jaffree, Justice Rehnquist's theory
has continued to grow in acceptance among the sitting Justices.95
90. See Michael W. McConnell, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment:
Where is the Supreme Court Heading?, 32 CATH. LAW. 187, 188-89 (1989).
91. See ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED TO
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 53 (1990). Adams and Emmerich have noted that:
While the public square can develop into a field of conflict between religious
views and symbols, religious differences, like political discord, are not an evil
per se; indeed, if expressed in a tolerant manner, they manifest a healthy de-
mocracy. In contrast to the separationists who would resolve this problem by
excluding religion altogether, the solution most consistent with our historical
commitment to religious liberty and free speech is to welcome religious expres-
sion.
Id.; see also Cord & Ball, supra note 69, at 904 (arguing that religion should be returned
to the political process); Lupu, supra note 71, at 249 ("[S]eparationism has a doctrine of
secular privilege at its heart; the public arena is for secular argument only. The case for
equal access for religious argument and practice challenges the hegemony of secular
ideology in the public square.").
92. See McConnell, supra note 32, at 14 ("Religion is under no special disability in
public life; indeed, it is at least as protected and encouraged as any other form of belief
and association-in some ways more so.").
93. Cord & Ball, supra note 69, at 920; see also Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 99.
94. See A.E. Dick Howard, The Wall of Separation: The Supreme Court as Uncer-
tain Stonemason, in RELIGION AND THE STATE-ESSAYS IN HONOR OF LEO PFEFFER 85,
102 (James E. Wood, Jr. ed., 1985) ("Political equality for religious groups requires that
they be able to participate in and have access to the benefits of government programs on
the same terms as other groups."); see also Rena M. Bila, Note, The Establishment
Clause: A Constitutional Permission Slip for Religion in Public Education, 60 BROOK.
L. REV. 1535, 1549 (1995).
95. See Lupu, supra note 71, at 238 ("Justice Rehnquist did not persuade a majority
in Wallace, but he did succeed in casting doubt on what had been the official history of
the Establishment Clause ....") (citations omitted); see also Esbeck, supra note 48, at
591 (noting that the Supreme Court is midstream in replacing "an older regime focused
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2. Establishment Clause Precedent
Since 1947,96 the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause juris-
prudence has included two doctrines. First, the Court has prohibit-
ed the government from funding core religious activities. Second,
the Court has allowed a religious organization to receive benefits
as a result of an independent third party's choice.
a. Prohibition of Government Funding for Core
Religious Activities
When decidingan Establishment Clause challenge, the Supreme
Court has first inquired whether the government program directly
aided a religious organization in performing its core sectarian func-
tions.97 The Court has held that such subsidies impermissibly
breach the "wall of separation" between church and State.98 While
there are numerous Supreme Court decisions which have enunciat-
ed the principle that the government cannot fund proselytization,99
Lemon v. Kurtzmant°° created the "modem test" for evaluating
whether a statute or government policy violates the Establishment
Clause.'0 '
In Lemon, the Court reviewed two state programs, one from
Rhode Island and one from Pennsylvania, on the grounds that each
on separationism with a new regime based on equality").
96. Joseph M. McMillan, Note, Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District: Lower-
ing the Establishment Clause Barrier in School-Aid Controversies, 39 ST. Louis U. L.J.
337, 342 (1994) ("Contemporary Establishment Clause jurisprudence begins with the
Supreme Court's 1947 decision in [Everson].") (citation omitted).
97. See, e.g., Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 ("New Jersey cannot consistently with the
'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment contribute tax-raised funds to
the support of an institution which teaches the tenets and faith of any church.").
98. See, e.g., id. ("No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they
may adopt to teach or practice religion.").
99. See, e.g., id.; see also Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 609-10 (1988); School
Dist. of the City of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985); Wolman v. Walter,
433 U.S. 229, 254 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 364-65 (1975); Committee
for Pub. Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 770-72 (1973); Hunt v.
McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973).
100. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
101. Burgess, supra note 45, at 1959.
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violated the Establishment Clause.0' The Rhode Island statute
authorized state officials to supplement the salaries of teachers of
secular subjects in nonpublic elementary schools. 0 3 The Pennsyl-
vania statute reimbursed non-public schools for their expenditures
for teachers' salaries, textbooks, and other secular instructional
materials. 1
4
The Court began by announcing three "principle evils" against
which the Establishment Clause was created to protect: (1) spon-
sorship, (2) financial support, and (3) active government involve-
ment in religious activity."5 Rather than promulgate rigid rules to
govern the relationship between church and State, the Court instead
sought to develop a flexible standard which would examine the
"character and purposes" of the benefitted institutions, the nature
of the State aid, and the resulting relationship between government
and religion." 6 The Court applied these standards and found that
both programs resulted in an impermissible degree of entanglement
between government and religion.' 7
The Court then turned to the Rhode Island program and noted
that when the government funded parochial schools, the result was
an entanglement of church and State due to the schools' religious
character.'08 The Court differentiated a permissible grant of neutral
102. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606.
103. Id. at 607 n.1 (construing R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 16-15-1 et seq. (Supp.
1970)). The program limited participating teachers' salaries and required that they teach
only subjects which were offered in the state's public schools. Id. at 607-08. Further-
more, a teacher had to agree in writing not to teach a course in religion during such time
as he or she received state money. Id. at 608.
104. Id. at 609 n.3 (construing PA. STAT. ANN., Tit. 24, §§ 5601-09 (Supp. 1971)).
Similar to the Rhode Island statute, the Pennsylvania statute required that a school seeking
reimbursement had to offer certain courses including: mathematics, modem foreign
languages, physical science, and physical education. Id. at 609-10.
105. Id. at 612 (citing Walz, 397 U.S. at 668). It was at this point that the Court
announced the now famous Lemon test: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive entanglement with
religion."' Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted).
106. Id. at 615.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 620. The Court accepted the district court's finding that the parochial
schools constituted "an integral part of the religious mission of the Catholic Church." Id.
at 616 (citation omitted). Furthermore, the Supreme Court agreed that the system served
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aid, such as secular textbooks, from the type of aid which the
Rhode Island program granted, because the Rhode Island teachers
could inject their religious viewpoints into all subjects, secular or
religious.1 9 As a result, the Court concluded that the government
would need to monitor the program to ensure that proselytization
did not occur."0
Similarly, the Court noted that Pennsylvania would need to
monitor sectarian schools receiving State aid to ensure that the
participating schools did not spend government funds to teach reli-
gion."' Further, the Court held that the Pennsylvania statute was
defective because it provided aid directly to religious schools."
2
Underlying this discussion was the Court's determination that such
programs would impermissibly place religious groups in opposition
to one another to receive government aid.113  Consequently, the
Court rejected both programs.1 4
as a "powerful vehicle for transmitting the Catholic faith to the next generation." Id. at
616 (citation omitted).
109. Id. at 617. While the Court was willing to accept, albeit after much discussion,
that teachers could successfully bleach all religious character out of their lesson plans, the
Court explained that the government would nonetheless have to watch the teacher to
ensure that the status quo continued. Id. at 618-19 ("Unlike a book, a teacher cannot be
inspected once so as to determine the extent and intent of his or her personal beliefs and
subjective acceptance of the limitations imposed by the First Amendment.").
110. Id. at 619.
111. Id. at 620-21.
112. Id. at 621. The' Court explained the difficulties inherent in direct grants to
religious organizations: "Obviously a direct money subsidy would be a relationship
pregnant with involvement and, as with most governmental grant programs, could encom-
pass sustained and detailed administrative relationships for enforcement of statutory or
administrative standards." Id. (citations omitted).
113. Id. at 623 ("Here we are confronted with successive and very likely permanent
annual appropriations that benefit relatively few religious groups. Political fragmentation
and divisiveness on religious lines are thus likely to be intensified.").
114. Id. at 625. The Court closed by noting that "[t]he Constitution decrees that
religion must be a private matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions of
private choice, and that while some involvement and entanglement are inevitable, lines
must be drawn." Id. Justice Douglas, in a lengthy concurrence, stated that the Court's
inquiry for potential Establishment Clause violations is not solely to determine the legisla-
tive purpose of the program; rather the second step is to ensure that "the end result-the
effect-is not an excessive government entanglement with religion." Id. at 627 (Douglas,
J., concurring) (citing Walz, 397 U.S. at 674).
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Two years later, the Court continued to articulate its opposition
to direct funding of religion. In Hunt v. McNair,"5 the Court was
faced with a challenge to South Carolina's statutory system which
subsidized higher educational institutions' financing of construction
and renovations, so long as the facility was not used for sectarian
instruction.1 6  The Court applied the Lemon test and upheld the
program.1 17 The majority noted, however, that:
Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect of
advancing religion when it flows to an institution in which
religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its func-
tions are subsumed in the religious mission or when it
funds a specifically religious activity in an otherwise sub-
stantially secular setting.'
The Court found that neither of the proscribed ills existed in Hunt,
as: (1) there was no information on the record to indicate that the
college's operations were primarily sectarian, and (2) the projects
which received government aid would not be used for religious
purposes.1 19 In determining whether there was a risk of govern-
ment entanglement in religious activities, the Court inquired wheth-
er the recipient of government aid was an instrument of religious
indoctrination.120 Finding that it was not, the Court allowed the
program to stand.1
21
115. 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
116. Id. at 735-36 (construing South Carolina Educational Facilities Authority Act,
S.C. CODE ANN. § 22-41 et seq. (Supp. 1971)).
117. Id. at 741-49. The Court applied the first prong of the Lemon test and found
that the purpose of the statute was manifestly secular. Id. at 741-42. The Court then
applied the second prong to find that the primary effect of the legislation was neither to
advance nor inhibit religion after determining that the College was not primarily a sectari-
an institution and that all government financed buildings were subject to the prohibition
against religious use. Id. at 742-45. Finally, the Court applied the third prong and found
that there was little fear of government entanglement in religious day-to-day activities.
Id. at 745-49.
118. Id. at 743.
119. Id. at 743-45 ("What little there is in the record concerning the College estab-
lishes that there are no religious qualifications for faculty membership or student admis-
sion, and that only 60% of the college student body is Baptist, a percentage roughly
equivalent to the percentage of Baptists in that area of South Carolina.").
120. Id. at 746.
121. Id. at 748-49. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall, dis-
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Next, in School District of the City of Grand Rapids v. Ball,122
the Court applied the prohibition against direct funding of core
religious functions and invalidated two programs in which taxpayer
money financed classes for nonpublic school students. 123  The
Court, relying on Everson, stated, "[n]o tax in any amount, large or
small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institu-
tions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may
adopt to teach or practice religion." 1 24 The majority noted the po-
tential for religion to cause divisiveness in society and reasoned
that the judiciary should protect citizens' rights to worship accord-
ing to their own conscience, while requiring the government to
remain neutral among religions, and between religion and
irreligion. 1
25
Applying the Lemon test, the Court held that the programs
sented and stated: "It]he Establishment Clause forbids far more than payment of public
funds directly to support sectarian institutions. It forbids any official involvement with
religion, whatever its form, which tends to foster or discourage religious worship or
belief." Id. at 754 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
122. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
123. Id. at 397-98. The two programs at issue were: the Community Education
Program and the Shared Time Program. Id. at 375. In the Shared Time Program, the
state offered classes at non-public schools during the course of the school day in subjects
such as remedial math. Id. The teachers were employees of the public school system,
although a number of them had previously taught in the non-public schools to which they
were assigned. Id. at 376. In the Community Education Program, the state sponsored
classes in non-public schools at the conclusion of the school day. Id. The Court found
that the students attending these programs were the same students who attended the non-
public schools during the day. Id. at 378. In fact, the Court noted, "[t]here is no evi-
dence that any public school student has ever attended a... class in a non-public school"
as forty of the forty-one schools in which this program operated were sectarian institu-
tions. Id. The district court found that although the program's purpose was secular, its
effect was to impermissibly advance religion; the Court of Appeals affirmed. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State v. School Dist. of Grand Rapids, 546 F. Supp.
1071 (W.D. Mich. 1983), affd, 718 F.2d 1389 (6th Cir. 1983) (cited in Ball, 473 U.S. at
375, 381).
124. Ball, 473 U.S. at 381 (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16).
125. Id. at 382. The Court explained further:
Only in this way can we "make room for as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds
as the spiritual needs of man deem necessary" and "sponsor an attitude on the
part of government that shows no partiality to any one group and lets each
flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma."
Id. (citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952)).
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impermissibly advanced religion. 126 It stated that "[a]lthough Es-
tablishment Clause jurisprudence is characterized by few absolutes,
the Clause does absolutely prohibit government-sponsored indoctri-
nation into the beliefs of a particular religious faith."'' 27 The Court
explained that when a religious organization receives government
subsidies, the judiciary must distinguish between impermissible
funding which contributes a "direct and substantial" advantage to
religion, and permissible aid which provides an "indirect and inci-
dental" benefit to a sectarian entity. 128  The Court found both pro-
grams to be constitutionally infirm, due to the risk that teachers
would use government funding to teach their sectarian institutions'
messages. 2 9 The Court explained that, unlike permissible secular
aid,' 30 the current programs could result in the direct and substan-
tial advancement of the sectarian enterprise. 3' Consequently, the
programs were unconstitutional.1 32
Finally, in Bowen v. Kendrick,133 the Court allowed a govern-
ment program to provide funding to religious organizations upon
finding that the sectarian entities were not using the aid to promote
126. Id. at 382-97. The Court accepted the district court's finding that the govern-
ment's purpose in creating the programs was manifestly secular. Id. at 383. As for the
second prong, the Court found that the public programs operating in religious schools
could impermissibly advance religion in three different ways: first, the programs' teach-
ers could either "intentionally or inadvertently inculcat[e] particular religious tenets or
beliefs"; second, the programs could "provide a crucial symbolic link between government
and religion"; and, third, the programs would provide a subsidy to "the primary religious
mission of the institutions affected." Id. at 384-85.
127. Id. at 385 (citations omitted). The Court continued, "[s]uch indoctrination, if
permitted to occur, would have devastating effects on the right of each individual volun-
tarily to determine what to believe (and what not to believe) free of any coercive pres-
sures from the State, while at the same time tainting the resulting religious beliefs with
a corrosive secularism." Id.
128. Id. at 394 (citations omitted).
129. Id. at 388.
130. Id. at 393. An example of permissible secular aid to a sectarian institution can
be found in Wolman v. Walter, 443 U.S. 229, 241-44 (1977), in which the Court upheld
a state program which provided diagnostic services to non-public schools. The Court
found little risk that the schools would employ government money for religious education-
al purposes. See id.
131. Ball, 473 U.S. at 396-97.
132. Id. at 397.
133. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
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a religious message. 34 The Court examined the Adolescent Family
Life Act ("AFLA") in which Congress had integrated the activities
of secular and sectarian organizations in order to limit adolescent
pregnancies. 135  The Court applied the Lemon test and upheld the
AFLA. 136 In deciding whether the AFLA had the primary effect of
advancing religion, the Court determined what limits to place on a
religious entity participating in a neutral government program. 37
While noting that religious institutions need not be quarantined
from neutral State aid, the Court cautioned that direct government
aid could not have the primary effect of advancing religion. 138 The
Court explained that there was no evidence to show that the AFLA
advanced any pervasively sectarian institutions' religious mission. 39
The Court further noted that although religious organizations were
authorized to accomplish many non-religious tasks, such tasks were
not converted into religious activities solely because sectarian orga-
nizations accomplished them.14° Finally, the Court remanded the
case to determine whether the AFLA's funds were being used for
improper purposes such as aid to pervasively sectarian institutions.1 41
134. Id. at 610-612.
135. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 593-97 (construing 42 U.S.C. § 300z to i-10 (1982 & Supp.
IV) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 300z to z-10 (1995))). Appellees challenged AFLA's
constitutionality arguing that it violated the First Amendment both on its face and as
applied. Id. at 597.
136. Id. at 602. First, the Court found that Congress was "motivated primarily, if
not entirely, by a legitimate secular purpose-the elimination or reduction of social and
economic problems caused by teenage sexuality, pregnancy and parenthood." Id. (cita-
tions omitted). Second, the Court found that the Act did not have the primary effect of
advancing religion. Id. at 604-15. Finally, the Court found that AFLA did not lead to
an excessive government entanglement with religion. Id. at 615-17.
137. Id. at 608-11.
138. Id. at 609. The Court then looked to the Hunt case for the proposition that
"[alid normally may be thought to have a primary effect of advancing religion when it
flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its
functions are subsumed in the religious mission . I..." d. at 610 (citing Hunt, 413 U.S.
at 743). It found that "nothing on the face of the AFLA indicates that a significant
proportion of the federal funds will be disbursed to 'pervasively sectarian' institutions."
Id.
139. Id. at 610-12.
140. Id. at 612-13.
141. Id. at 620-21.
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Justice O'Connor concurred and stated that while she agreed
with the dissenters that "any use of public funds to promote reli-
gious doctrine violates the Establishment Clause,"'' 42 she did not
believe that the record contained instances of such impermissible
uses of funds. 43 She explained that the case should be remanded
to the district court to determine whether such abuses were occur-
ring.14 Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia, concurred with
the majority and argued that when the Court determines whether a
statute violates the Establishment Clause "as applied," the question
is not "whether the entity is of a religious character, but how it
spends its grant."'' 4
5
b. Funding of Religious Entities through Independent
Third-parties
A second relevant principle in the adjudication of Establishment
Clause challenges is determining whether the sectarian institution
received aid as a result of private choice or government action.
This principle recognizes that a State "may issue a paycheck to one
of its employees, who may then donate all or part of that paycheck
142. Id. at 622-23 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 623-24. Justice O'Connor remarked that "appellees may yet prevail on
remand, and I do not believe that the Court's approach entails a relaxation of the 'unwa-
vering vigilance that the Constitution requires against any law "respecting an establish-
ment of religion .... Id. at 623 (citations omitted).
145. Id. at 624-25 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun, however, responded:
Justice Kennedy joined by Justice Scalia, would further constrain the district
court's consideration of the evidence as to how grantees spent their money,
regardless of whether the grantee could be labeled "pervasively sectarian"...
.This statement comes without citation to authority and is contrary to the clear
import of our cases . . . . Not surprisingly, the Court flatly rejects Justice
Kennedy's suggestion, observing that "it will be open to appellees on remand
to show that ALFA aid is flowing to grantees that can be considered 'pervasive-
ly sectarian' religious institutions."
Id. at 652 n.16 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Justice Blackmun instead
argued that the statute impermissibly advanced religion and should be struck down with-
out a remand. Id. at 635-53. A commentator noted that "[w]hile Justice Blackmun
espouses the traditional interpretation of 'no aid to religion,' [the majority] embraces the
revisionist interpretation of affirmative aid to religion." Gay, supra note 49, at 979; see
also infra part II.D.1 (discussing the Court's opinion in Rosenberger, which allowed
religious organizations to receive aid from a neutral government program).
[Vol. 6:871
ESTABLISHMENT CLA USE
to a religious institution, all without constitutional barrier; and the
State may do so even knowing that the employee so intends to
dispose of his salary."'4
In Mueller v. Allen, 147 the Court was faced with a Minnesota
plan which allowed taxpayers to deduct certain educational expens-
es incurred when their children attended private schools.14 8  The
Court, guided by the Lemon test, upheld the plan. 149 It explained
that "by channeling whatever assistance it may provide to parochial
schools through individual parents, Minnesota has reduced the
Establishment Clause objections to which its action is subject."'' 50
The Court further explained that public funds reached sectarian
institutions solely through the private choices of parents rather than
due to direct government funding. 151  Consequently, the Court
found that religious organizations would not be competing against
one another for state aid.' 52  As a result, the Court upheld the
plan. 153
Next, in Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the
146. Witters v. Washington Dep't. of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 486-87
(1986); see also Esbeck, supra note 48, at 618 ("Equality is the operative principle when
government benefits are directed to all individuals without regard to religion, who are
given complete freedom of choice regarding how they may 'spend' that benefit.").
147. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
148. Id. at 390 (construing MINN. STAT. § 290.09, Subd. 22, (1982) (repealed 1987)).
The deduction was limited to "'tuition, textbooks and transportation' of dependents attend-
ing elementary or secondary schools." Id. at 391.
149. Id. at 394-404; see also McMillan, supra note 96, at 359 ("[The Court] began
by noting the tentative nature of the [Lemon test] .... Despite its reservation about the
merits of [the Lemon test], the Court applied [it] to the facts at hand."). First, the Court
found that the legislature did not pass the statute specifically to fund religious organiza-
tion, but rather to "defray the cost of educational expenses incurred by par-
ents-regardless of the type of schools their children attend ...." Mueller, 463 U.S. at
395. Second, the Court found that the benefits flowed primarily to the parents and not
the institutions. Id. at 399-402. Finally, the Court explained that there was no substantial
fear of entanglement except in determining whether the deductions were legitimate. id.
at 403.
150. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 399-400.
153. Id. at 403. Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens,
dissented on the grounds that the program had the "direct and immediate effect of advanc-
ing religion." Id. at 404-05 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
19961
898 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
Blind, 54 the Court held that the Establishment Clause did not pre-
clude Washington state from subsidizing a blind petitioner's educa-
tion under a state vocational rehabilitation assistance program in his
studies at a Christian college.155 The Court applied the Lemon test
and found that the sole issue was whether the extension of aid to
the petitioner was a direct subsidy to the religious organization. 156
The Court explained that the government provided the funding to
the student who then transferred the aid to an institution of his or
her choice. 5 7 The Court distinguished the Washington state pro-
gram from the one struck down in Ball, where the Court held that
aid, purportedly benefiting students, was actually subsidizing reli-
gion.158  In so doing, the Court noted that Witters, unlike the stu-
dents in Ball, exercised private choice on where to spend his subsi-
dy and thus the program did not act as a conduit to fund religion. 59
Consequently, the Court held that the program did not
impermissibly advance religion. '60
154. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
155. Id. at 482 (construing WASH. REV. CODE § 74.16.181 (1981) (repealed 1983)).
The petitioner, suffering from a progressive eye condition, was a student at the Inland
Empire School of the Bible at which he was preparing for a career in the church. Id. at
483. He was eligible for aid under the Washington statute which sought to provide
funding for the visually handicapped. Id. at 483. The Washington Commission for the
Blind (the government entity which distributed the funds) denied the petitioner aid on the
grounds that "[t]he Washington State constitution forbids the use of public funds to assist
an individual in the pursuit of a career or degree in theology or related areas." Id. (cita-
tions omitted) (alteration in original). A state hearings examiner upheld the ban "in light
of the State Constitution's prohibition against the state directly or indirectly supporting
a religion." Id. at 484 (citation omitted). The Superior Court affirmed on similar
grounds. Id. The Washington Supreme Court, however, applied the Lemon test and
affirmed based on the Federal Constitution. 689 P.2d. 53, 55 (Wash. 1984).
156. Witters, 474 U.S. at 485-89. The Court resolved the first prong by stating "all
parties concede the unmistakably secular purpose of the Washington program. That
program was designed to promote the well-being of the visually handicapped through the
provision of vocational rehabilitation services . I..." Id. at 485-86.
157. Id. at 487.
158. Id. at 487 n.4; see also supra notes 122-32 and accompanying text (discussing
Ball).
159. Witters, 474 U.S. at 488.
160. Id. at 489. Justice Powell, in a concurrence joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Rehnquist, explained that: "Mueller makes the answer clear: state programs that
are wholly neutral in offering educational assistance to a class defined without reference
to religion do not violate the second part of the [Lemon test], because any aid to religion
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Finally, in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,161 the
Court allowed government funding to reach a religious entity
through an independent third-party's choice.162 The Court judged
whether the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA")
and its Arizona counterpart violated the Establishment Clause by
providing a translator to accompany a student to a sectarian
school.163  At the outset, the Court noted that both Mueller and
Witters stood for the proposition that neutral government programs
were not subject to an Establishment Clause challenge solely be-
cause sectarian institutions received an attenuated financial bene-
fit.164 The Court explained that the Arizona program provided no
results from the private choices of individual beneficiaries." Id. at 490-91 (Powell, J.,
concurring) (citations omitted). Justice O'Connor concurred and added, "[tihe aid to
religion at issue here is the result of the petitioner's private choice. No reasonable ob-
server is likely to draw from the facts before us an inference that the State itself is en-
dorsing a religious practice or belief." Id. at 493 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
161. 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
162. Id. at 2469.
163. Id. at 2464 (construing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (currently codified at U.S.C.
§§ 1400-1491) (1994 & Supp. 1 1995)) and ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-761 to -772
(1991) (currently codified as ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-761 to -772 (1995))). The
Petitioner, deaf since birth, sought to attend a Roman Catholic High School in Tucson,
Arizona, and requested, pursuant to IDEA and its Arizona counterpart, that the respondent
school district provide him with a sign language interpreter to accompany him to classes
as was provided when the petitioner had attended public school. Id. Acting according
to the counsel of both the County Attorney and the State Attorney General, the school
district refused to provide for the interpreter on the assumption that it would violate the
Constitution. Id. The petitioner subsequently brought suit under 20 U.S.C. §
1415(e)(4)(a) which grants federal district courts jurisdiction to all questions arising out
of the IDEA. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2464. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
upheld the district court's conclusion that providing the interpreter would violate the
Establishment Clause. Zobrest, 963 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1992).
164. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2466-67. A commentator noted:
In discussing Mueller and Witters as precedent, the [Court] identified two fac-
tors determinative of the outcomes in those cases. Both factors were also pres-
ent in Zobrest. The first of these was the "class of beneficiaries" factors...
The assistance dispensed under the provisions of the IDEA was "aid not to
schools but to individual handicapped children." The second factor linking this
case to Mueller and Witters was the choice issue. In the view of the Court, the
IDEA does not on its own put government employees into sectarian institutions,
but it does allow the parents to exercise that option in their use of the assistance
that it provides.
McMillan, supra note 96, at 373.
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financial incentive for a parent to send his or her child to sectarian
schools, and concluded that the interpreter's presence on sectarian
school grounds was wholly a result of the parents' private choice. 165
The Court distinguished Ball on the grounds that: (1) the IDEA
did not relieve sectarian schools of costs they would have other-
wise borne in educating their students, and (2) the sign-language
interpreters, unlike teachers or guidance counselors, objectively
transmitted the students' surroundings. 166 Consequently, the Court
noted that the school district could provide the petitioner with the
interpreter without violating the Establishment Clause. 167
B. The Free Speech Clause
"Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press ....168
While many consider the Free Speech Clause to guarantee be
a fundamental freedom under the United States' Constitutional
scheme,' 69 the Supreme Court has struggled in determining the
165. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2467-68.
166. Id. at 2468-69.
167. Id. at 2469. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor and Souter
in part I of his dissent, noted that the case should have been remanded on the grounds
that there was no need to pass judgment on the constitutionality of an issue when there
were alternate grounds on which to decide the controversy. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
In part II, Justice Blackmun, joined only by Justice Souter, stated that -[a]t Salpointe,
where the secular and the sectarian are 'inextricably intertwined,' governmental assistance
to the educational function of the school necessarily entails governmental participation in
the school's inculcation of religion." Id. at 2472. He explained that this violated the
well-established principle that proscribed the potential use of government funding for the
transmission of sectarian messages. Id. at 2473. He distinguished Mueller and Witters
by stating that those cases ended with a disbursement of funds or the lessening of a tax,
while the case at bar involved "ongoing, daily and intimate governmental participation in
the teaching and propagation of religious doctrine." Id. at 2474. Blackmun concluded
that religious autonomy was best served by leaving religion independent from the State.
Id. at 2474-75.
168. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
169. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring). Justice Brandeis noted:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was
to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government the
deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary .... They believed that
freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable
to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and
assembly discussion would be futile ... and that this should be a fundamental
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contours of its application. 70 In the 1970s and 1980s, both liberal
and conservative justices endorsed an analysis predicated on con-
tent neutrality.1 71 Content neutrality requires laws and regulations
to be "viewpoint neutral."' 7 2 Under this analysis, the government
can neither favor the proponents nor opponents of a particular argu-
ment. '73 Consequently, any attempt to differentiate a speaker based
on the content of his or her message is held to be presumptively
invalid. 174
The Supreme Court first applied the content neutral analysis in
Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley.'7 In Mosley, the peti-
tioner challenged a municipal ordinance which prohibited all dem-
onstrations within 150 feet of public schools, except when such
principle of the American government.
Id.; see also Stacey J. Rappaport, Note, Rules of the Road: The Constitutional Limits of
Restricting Indecent Speech on the Information Superhighway, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.,
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 301 (1995) (arguing that government can only limit speech in narrow
circumstances).
170. See Viktor Mayer-Schonberger & Teree E. Foster, More Speech, Less Noise:
Amplifying Content-Based Speech Regulations Through Binding International Law, 18
B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 59, 67 (1995) ('The majority of the Court has not yet
settled upon a defining ideology to justify the veneration it accords to free speech.")
(citations omitted); see also Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First
Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615, 616 (1991) ("The doctrinal web surrounding the
free speech clause of the first amendment is one of the most complicated and confusing
in constitutional law.").
171. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Discrimination, Distribution and Free Speech, 37
ARIz. L. REV. 439 (1995) ("Free speech issues in recent years have commanded a rare
judicial consensus, uniting Justices from Brennan to Scalia."); see also George G. Size
& Glenn R. Britton, Is there Hate Speech?: R.A.V. and Mitchell in the Context of First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 913, 914 (1995).
172. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992) (noting that the
government cannot regulate speech based on "hostility-or favoritism-towards the
underlying message expressed"); see also Size & Britton, supra note 171, at 914-15
(explaining content neutrality).
173. See Mayer-Schonberger & Foster, supra note 170, at 72 ("[T]he Court avoids
direct contact with content as if it were a hot iron. The words themselves, and the ideas
they communicate, are simply not the determinative factor examined by the Court in
appraising content-based regulations.").
174. Size & Britton, supra note 171, at 914-15.
175. 408 U.S. 92 (1972); see also Size & Britton, supra note 171, at 915 (explaining
that Mosley was "the leading case enunciating the content neutrality approach .... ).
1996]
902 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
picketing was peaceful and part of a labor dispute. 176 The Court
struck down the ordinance on the grounds that it made an imper-
missible distinction between labor picketing and other peaceful
picketing. 177 While the Court ultimately decided the case based on
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 178 it
noted that the Free Speech Clause was significant in the analysis.
179
The Court found that the ordinance described permissible picketing
on the basis of its subject matter: peaceful picketing was prohibit-
ed unless the demonstrators were voicing a particular viewpoint.
80
The Court noted that "[t]he operative distinction [was] the message
176. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 92-93 (construing CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE, C. 193-
l(i) (1968)). The appellant peacefully carried a sign which read, "Jones High School
practices black discrimination. Jones High School has a black quota." Id. at 93. Upon
they city's passage of the statute, the petitioner brought suit seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Mosley, 408 U.S.
at 93-94. While the district court granted a directed verdict dismissing the complaint, the
Seventh Circuit reversed on the grounds that the ordinance was overbroad as it "prohibit-
ed even peaceful picketing next to a school .... ." Id. at 94 (citations omitted).
177. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 94.
178. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state shall ... deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws"). When applying the Equal Protection
Clause, the Court examines whether there is an appropriate governmental interest which
is furthered when similarly situated groups are treated differently. See, e.g., Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-77 (1971).
179. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 94-95. The Court stated:
[U]nder the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the First Amendment itself,
government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds
acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more con-
troversial views .... There is an "equality of status in the field of ideas," and
government must afford all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard.
Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups, govern-
ment may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis of what
they intend to say.
id. at 96.
180. Id. at 95. The Court further noted:
To permit the continued building of our politics and culture, and to assure self-
fulfillment for each individual, our people are guaranteed the right to express
any thought, free from government censorship. The essence of this forbidden
censorship is content control. Any restriction on expressive activity because of
its content would completely undercut the "profound national commitment to
the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open."
Id. at 95-96 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
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on [the] sign." ' Consequently, the Court struck down the ordi-
nance under the Equal Protection Clause.18
2
Next, in Carey v. Brown,183 the Court continued the process of
integrating content neutrality into the Free Speech Clause from its
origins within the Equal Protection Clause.1 84 The Court was faced
with an Illinois law which prohibited the picketing of dwellings,
except when the residence was the place of employment involved
in a labor dispute.185 The Court found that the ordinance regulated
expressive conduct falling under the First Amendment's preserve,
and noted that it accorded preferential treatment to views on a
certain subject while restricting all others.1 86  The Court struck
down the law, holding that it was constitutionally indistinguishable
from the one invalidated in Mosley.
t8 7
181. Id. at 95.
182. Id. at 101-02. One commentator concluded that, "[i]n [Mosley], the Court
clearly announced the first amendment's antipathy for content discrimination and, less
clearly, described what content discrimination meant .... [T]he best interpretation of
the case is that the Court's concern about content discrimination extended beyond dis-
criminatory government purposes." Williams, supra note 170, at 624 (citations omitted).
183. 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
184. See id.; see also Size & Britton, supra note 171, at 916 ("[Carey] thus complet-
ed the migration of content neutrality from its equal protection origins to its independent
existence in free speech law.").
185. Carey, 447 U.S. at 457 (construing ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, § 21.1-2 (1977)).
The appellants participated in a peaceful demonstration in front of the Mayor of Chica-
go's home in order to protest his alleged failure to support school busing programs direct-
ed towards improving integration of the city's schools. Id. They were arrested and
subsequently pled guilty to unlawful residential picketing. Id. The appellants brought suit
in Federal Court alleging that the state statute was unconstitutional, but the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied all relief. 462 F. Supp. 518
(N.D. Ill. 1978). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed on the grounds
that the statute, both on its face and as applied, violated the Equal Protection Clause. 602
F.2d 791 (7th Cir. 1979).
186. Carey, 447 U.S. at 459-63. In a footnote, the Court explained that while the
Illinois statute discriminated on the basis of the speaker's subject matter rather than his
particular viewpoint, "[tihe First Amendment's hostility to content-based regulations
extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public
discussion of an entire topic." Id. at 462 n.6 (citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1979)).
187. Id. at 461. The Court cited to Mosley to illustrate that both ordinances violated
the Equal Protection Clause and First Amendment. Id. at 462-63. Justice Stewart joined
the majority's opinion and reasoned that while the Court's opinions in Carey and Mosley
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Lastly, in R.A.V v. City of St. Paul,' the Court applied the
content neutral analysis to the First Amendment. 9 The Court
invalidated a city ordinance which prohibited individuals from
placing symbols which they knew, or had reasonable grounds to
know, would arouse "anger, alarm or resentment" on the basis of
race, color, creed, religion, or gender.' 9° The Court noted that
while content based regulations were presumptively invalid, such
restrictions were acceptable in limited areas such as defamation and
obscenity because the Court must interpret content to proscribe the
speech.19' Within such categories, however, the government may
not regulate speakers based on "hostility-or favoritism-towards
invoked the Equal Protection Clause, both cases explicated the "basic meaning" of the
Free Speech Clause. Id. at 471 (Stewart, J., concurring). Stewart noted that:
[Wihile a municipality may constitutionally impose reasonable time, place, and
manner regulations on the use of its streets and sidewalks for First Amendment
purposes, and may even forbid altogether such use of some of its facilities; what
a municipality may not do under the First and Fourteenth Amendments is to
discriminate in the regulation of expression on the basis of the content of that
expression.
Id. at 471-72 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
188. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
189. See id. at 391; see also Size & Britton, supra note 171, at 920-21.
190. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 380 (construing ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. -CODE § 292.02
(1990)). The respondent city of St. Paul charged the petitioner under this statute for
allegedly burning a cross in the yard of an African-American family. Id. The trial court
found the ordinance to be overbroad and impermissibly content based and dismissed the
count. Id. at 380. The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, reversed on the grounds that
the ordinance prohibited only Chaplinsky-type "fighting words," see Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942), a type of expression to which First Amendment
protections do not extend. In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510-11 (Minn.
1991).
191. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383. The Court explained that the government could not
proscribe such areas of speech solely based on content, even if First Amendment
protections did not extend to these types of speech. Id. at 386. Some commentators have
noted:
Although [the Court] begins by acknowledging areas squarely outside of content
neutral analysis, such as libel and obscenity, this in no way hinders [the Court]
in [its] objective, which is nothing less than to make content neutrality the
governing wheel of free press/free speech law. Rather, [the Court] proceeds
ahead to develop an overall theory of First Amendment law under the rubric of
content neutral analysis.
Size & Britton, supra note 171, at 921-22 (citations omitted).
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the underlying message expressed."' 92
Turning to the city ordinance, the Court held that it was facially
unconstitutional on two grounds. 193 First, the Court explained that
the ordinance protected Free Speech rights unless an individual
expressed himself about a topic proscribed by the ordinance. 94 If,
for example, a speaker sought to provoke a group not listed by the
ordinance, he or she could employ "abusive invective, no matter
how vicious or severe . ,,.9' The speaker, however, could not
use such expression when decrying a classification enumerated in
the ordinance. 96  As a result, the Court found that St. Paul had
placed special prohibitions on speakers expressing views on
"disfavored subjects."' 97
Second, the Court explained that the ordinance discriminated
according to a speaker's viewpoint. 98 The Court noted that the
ordinance would outlaw both sides of the debate from employing
certain symbolic speech such as racial epithets. 99 The ordinance
did not prohibit, however, those arguing in favor of tolerance from
using "'fighting words' that do not invoke race, color, creed or
religion."2' The result was that the ordinance limited the available
language for racist individuals, but would allow free reign to those
arguing in favor of tolerance. 20' Consequently, the Court struck
192. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 386. The Court further noted that "[w]hen the basis for the
content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at
issue is proscribable, no significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination exists."
Id. at 388. In addition, the government may regulate speech based on its potential sec-
ondary effects. Id. at 389. Such bases "refute the proposition that the selectivity of the
restriction is 'even arguably "conditioned upon the sovereign's agreement with what a
speaker may intend to say.""' Id. at 390 (citations omitted).
193. Id. at 391-96.
194. Id. at 391-92.
195. Id. at 391. The Court explained that the ordinance did not preclude an individu-
al from using "fighting words" on the basis of political affiliation, union membership or
homosexuality. Id.
196. Id. at 392.
197. Id. at 391.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 391-92.
201. Id. at 391. The Court noted that:
One could hold up a sign saying, for example, that all "anti-Catholic bigots" are
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down the ordinance.202
C. The "Hybrid" Cases
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion ... or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
t9203press ....
The Supreme Court has combined the Free Speech and Estab-
lishment Clauses and overturned government regulations prohibit-
ing religious entities access to public fora. In so doing, the Court
developed the principle that once the government opened a forum
for general public use, it could not exclude sectarian groups.2°
misbegotten; but not that all "papists" are, for that would insult and provoke
violence "on the basis of religion." St. Paul has no such authority to license
one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Mar-
quis of Queensbury Rules.
Id. at 391-92.
202. Id. at 396. The Court closed by noting, "[l]et there be no mistake about our
belief that burning a cross in someone's front yard is reprehensible. But St. Paul has
sufficient means at its disposal to prevent such behavior without adding the First Amend-
ment to the fire." Id. at 396. A commentator summed up, "R.A.V. is consistent with
traditional First Amendment analysis . . . The Court ...advised that government
regulation of fighting words must be viewpoint-neutral and cannot be aimed solely at
racist speech." Gaumer, supra note 4, at 17 (citations omitted).
Justice White concurred, explaining that the ordinance regulated protected speech.
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 397-98 (White, J., concurring). He explained that the Court's ap-
proach of categorizing speech as within and outside the First Amendment's protections
"has provided a principled and narrowly focused means for distinguishing between expres-
sion that the government may regulate freely and that which it may regulate on the basis
of content only upon a showing of compelling need." Id. at 400. He criticized the
majority for applying content neutral restrictions to non-protected speech. Id. at 400-01;
see also Williams, supra note 170, at 619 (arguing that the rise of content-neutrality has
ignored independent lines of free speech doctrine).
Justice Stevens, in a separate concurrence, noted that "content-based distinctions, far
from being presumptively invalid, are an inevitable and indispensable aspect of a coherent
understanding of the First Amendment." id. at 420 (Stevens, J., concurring). He ex-
plained that the scope of the First Amendment was determined by the content of the
speech, for whether or not expression falls into a "protected" or "unprotected" category
is determined, at least in part, by its content. Id. at 421. He noted that the Court's
decision to presumptively invalidate content-based regulation of speech would wreak
"havoc in an area of settled law." Id. at 425. Consequently, Stevens would have upheld
the ordinance had it not been overbroad. Id. at 436.
203. U.S. CONST. amend I.
204. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 272-74 (1981); see also Esbeck,
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These cases vary in the types of fora and speech involved.
In Widmar v. Vincent,25 the Court granted a religious organiza-
tion equal access to a public university's facilities. 2°6 The Court
examined a University of Missouri at Kansas City ("UMKC") poli-
cy which, while encouraging student activities, excluded a religious
organization named Cornerstone from conducting its meetings on
campus-owned property.207 The Court explained that because
UMKC had created an open forum, it could not deny Cornerstone's
members access to UMKC facilities based on the content of their
speech; to do so presumptively violated the students' Free Speech
rights. 20 8 Consequently, the Court inquired whether UMKC could
justify its policy by demonstrating it to be: (1) necessary to serve
a compelling State interest, and (2) narrowly tailored to achieve
that end.209
The Court held that UMKC's Establishment Clause defense did
not constitute a compelling State interest.2'0 The Court noted that
while a public university's obligation to comply with the Establish-
ment Clause was a compelling interest, UMKC could allow reli-
gious organizations "equal access" to public facilities without vio-
supra note 48, at 617 ("Equality as a rule of law is the norm when it comes to private
speech of religious content. When the speech takes place on public property, or as the
cases say, 'speech in a public forum,' equal access is the rule.").
205. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
206. Id. at 277.
207. Id. at 265. The Court noted that Cornerstone was "an organization of evangeli-
cal Christian students from various denominational backgrounds .... A typical Corner-
stone meeting included prayers, hymns, Bible commentary, and discussion of religious
views and experiences." id. at 265 n.2. Eleven members of the organization brought suit
in federal court alleging that UMKC's discrimination against religious activity violated
their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at 266. The district court, upon cross-
motions for summary judgment, found the regulations to be required by the Establishment
Clause as "the State could not provide facilities for religious use without giving prohibited
support to an institution of religion." Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 915-16 (W.D.
Mo. 1979). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the Uni-
versity's regulation was content based for which it could not find a compelling interest.
635 F.2d 1310, 1315-20 (8th Cir. 1980).
208. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 268-69.
209. Id. at 270.
210. Id. at 276-77.
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lating the Lemon test.211  The Court reasoned that Cornerstone's
presence in UMKC's open forum was an incidental benefit which
did not impermissibly advance religion.212 The Court explained
that: (1) access does not confer "any imprimatur of state approval"
of religion, and (2) the broad class of both religious and non-reli-
gious speakers able to use the forum would render it essentially
secular.213 Consequently, the Court struck down the prohibition. 4
Next, in Board of Education of the Westside Community
Schools v. Mergens,215 the Court allowed a religious organization
equal access to a public high school's facilities. 6 The Court over-
turned the City of Omaha's Westside School District's
("Westside") policy which denied students the opportunity to form
211. Id. at 271. The Court explained that the first and third prongs were easily met
as the open forum policy "would have a secular purpose and would avoid entanglement
with religion." Id. at 271-72 (citations omitted).
212. Id. at 274. In a footnote, the Court noted:
As the dissent emphasizes, the Establishment Clause requires the State to distin-
guish between "religious" speech-speech, undertaken or approved by the State,
the primary affect of which is to support an establishment of religion-and
"nonreligious" speech-speech, undertaken or approved by the State, the prima-
ry affect of which is not to support an establishment of religion. This distinc-
tion is required by the plain text of the Constitution. It is followed in our cases.
Id. at 271 n.9.
213. Id. at 274-75; see also Susan Ehrmann, Note, Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free School District: Creating Greater Protection for Religious Speech
Through the Illusion of Public Forum Analysis, 1994 WiS. L. REV. 965, 978-79 (1994)
(explaining that the Court held an open access policy would further free speech rights
without implicating the Establishment Clause).
214. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277. Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion in order
to emphasize the importance of academic freedom of public universities and to decry the
majority's use of the term compelling state interest. Id. at 277-281 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring). He noted that a university may look into a speaker's content in order to determine
whether or not the subjects are relevant for an academic debate; it may not, however,
"allow its agreement or disagreement with the viewpoint of a particular speaker to deter-
mine whether access to a forum will be granted." Id. at 280. He concurred with the
judgment because he believed that the record disclosed no danger of potential Establish-
ment Clause violations. Id. at 280-81. Justice White dissented, arguing that he believed
"the States to be a good deal freer to formulate policies that affect religion in divergent
ways than [did] the majority." Id. at 282 (White, J., dissenting).
215. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
216. Id. at 252-53.
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a Christian Club.217 The Court explained that when a public school
granted access to a non-curriculum related student group, the Equal
Access Act ("Act") mandated that it had created a "limited open
forum., 218  The Court concluded that, pursuant to the Act, the
school was prohibited from denying access to any organization
based on the "religious, political, philosophical, or other content of
the speech at such meetings., 21 9  The Court found that Westside
had created a "limited open forum" and that its exclusion of the
respondents, due to the religious content of their speech, violated
the Act.22°
217. Id. at 232. Respondents were students at a secondary school in Omaha, Nebras-
ka and were permitted to join and form student groups and clubs which met at the close
of the school day. Id. at 231. The petitioners sought to establish a club whose "purpose
would have been, among other things, to permit the students to read and discuss the
Bible, to have fellowship, and to pray together." Id. at 232. The administration denied
the request and the students brought suit in the United States District Court in the District
of Nebraska seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Mergens, No. CV 85-0-426, slip
op. (D. Neb. 1988). The district court entered judgment for the school on the rationale
that Westside did not constitute a "limited open forum" as all of its clubs were tied to the
school's educational function. Id. The Eighth Circuit reversed, explaining that the school
district had instituted a limited public forum and that the school district's decision to
exclude the respondents thus discriminated against the respondents' viewpoint. 867 F.2d
1076, 1078-79 (8th Cir. 1989).
218. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 235 (construing the Equal Access Act ("Act"), 20 U.S.C.
§ 4071-74 (1984) (currently codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995)).
In 1984, Congress passed the Act, which provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which receives Federal
financial assistance and which has a limited open forum to deny equal access
or a fair opportunity to, or discriminate against, any students who wish to con-
duct a meeting within that limited open forum on the basis of the religious,
political, philosophical or other content of the speech at such meetings.
20 U.S.C. § 4071(a); see also Leah Gallant Morgenstein, Board of Education of Westside
Community Schools v. Mergens: Three "R's" + Religion = Mergens, 41 AM. U. L. REV.
221, 234-37 (1991) (discussing the Equal Access Act). After much debate, the Court
decided that "the term 'noncurriculum related student group' is best interpreted broadly
to mean any student group that does not directly relate to the body of courses offered by
the school." Mergens, 496 U.S. at 235.
219. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 235 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a)). The Court noted,
"even if a public secondary school allows only one 'noncurriculum related student group'
to meet, the Act's obligations are triggered and the school may not deny other clubs, on
the basis of the content of their speech, equal access to meet on school premises during
noninstructional time." Id. at 236.
220. Id. at 246-47.
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The Court next considered whether the Establishment Clause
provided a rationale for Westside's exclusion of the Christian
Club.221 The Court noted that it had applied the Lemon test in
Widmar and granted a religious organization access to a public
forum.222 Consequently, the Court reasoned that Westside's policy
would not impermissibly advance religion because: (1) the chil-
dren would not perceive that Westside endorsed the Club's reli-
gious message due to the difference between "government speech
endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids," and
private speech endorsing religion which the Free Speech Clause
protects; (2) the Act limited the presence of teachers and mandated
that the meetings be held during noninstruction time; and (3) the
proposed club was one of a broad spectrum of activities present in
the district.223 Consequently, the Court determined that the Act did
not have the primary effect of advancing religion.22
Finally, in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
School District,225 the Court allowed a church to show a religious
film in a public school.226 The Court noted that the respondent
221. Id. at 247.
222. Id. at 248 (citing Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271-75 (applying the Lemon test)); see
also Ehrmann, supra note 213, at 985 ("Mergens was consistent with Widmar in catego-
rizing constraints on religious expression as content-based.").
223. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250-52.
224. Id. at 252-53. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia, concurred, noting that
as long as government does not give "direct benefits to religion in such a degree that it
in fact 'establishes a [State] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so,"' the proper test
is to determine whether the government coerced religious activity in any way. Id. at 260
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Justice Kennedy was critical of the plurali-
ty's endorsement test and noted that "no constitutional violation occurs if the school's
action is based upon a recognition of the fact that membership in a religious club is one
of many permissible ways for a student to further his or her own personal enrichment."
Id. at 261. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, concurred, arguing that the
majority's decision was correct, but noting that, as this case falls in the intersection
between the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses, the district had to take specific steps
in order to avoid the appearance of endorsing the religious organization. See id. at 263-64
(Marshall, J., concurring). Finally, Justice Stevens dissented on the grounds that the
majority had misconstrued the statute and unnecessarily limited the discretion of every
public school in determining whether to permit access to non-curriculum groups. Id. at
271 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
225. 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
226. Id. at 2149. The petitioner was an evangelical church who sought permission
to use school facilities in order to show a film series based on a traditional Christian
perspective. Id. at 2144-45. Upon its second denial, the Church brought suit in federal
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school district's decision to allow outside groups use of school
property created a "general public forum"; as a result, the school
district could not allocate space based on approval of a group's
message.227 The Court found that the petitioner's films were per-
missible outside of their religious viewpoint.228 Consequently, the
Court held that the school district's exclusion was solely due to the
films' content and thus violated of the church members' Free
Speech rights.229
The Court explained that permitting a sectarian organization to
use government property under an "open access" policy would pass
the Lemon test.230 The Court noted that the film: (1) would not be
shown during school hours, (2) would not appear to have been
sponsored by the school, and (3) would be open to the general
public, not solely church members. 231 As a result, the Court found
"no realistic danger" that the members of the community would
believe that the school district endorsed the church.232 The Court
court challenging the denial as a violation of the Freedom of Speech and Assembly
Clauses, the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, and the Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Lamb's Chapel, 770 F. Supp. 91, 92 (E.D.N.Y.
1991). The district court granted summary judgment for the school district, noting that
the denial in this case was viewpoint neutral and thus permissible as the district had not
opened its facilities to any competing religious groups; the Second Circuit affirmed in all
respects. Id. at 92, 98-99, aff'd, 959 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1992).
227. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2147-48. The Court found it irrelevant that all
religions were treated equally by the school district for "the critical question [is] whether
it discriminates on the basis of viewpoint to permit school property to be used for the
presentation of all views about family issues and child rearing except those dealing with
the subject matter from a religious standpoint." Id. at 2147.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 2147-49.
230. Id. at 2148. The Court noted that the government program had a secular pur-
pose, did not have the primary effect of advancing religion, and did not foster an exces-
sive entanglement with religion. Id.
In a footnote, Justice White, the author of the majority opinion and a well-known
critic of the Lemon test, responded to Justice Scalia's concurrence: "While we are some-
what diverted by Justice Scalia's evening at the cinema, we return to the reality that there
is a proper way to inter an established decision and Lemon, however frightening it may
be to some, has not been overruled. This case.., presents no occasion to do so." Id.
at 2148 n.7 (citations omitted).
231. Id. at 2148.
232. Id.
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concluded that the Establishment Clause did not constitute a com-
pelling interest to prohibit the organization from participating in the
public forum.233
II. ROSENBERGER V. RECTOR & VISITORS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
VIRGINIA
A. Facts: from Genesis to the Federal Courts
The University of Virginia ("University") established a Student
Activities Fund ("SAP) in order to grant financial support to affili-
ated student organizations.234 At the time of Rosenberger's suit, the
SAF collected a mandatory fee from every full time student.235
Although the University was responsible for the SAF's operation,
the University's Student Council ("Student Council") allocated
money to organizations whose purpose was consistent with the
University's educational mission.236 To procure funds from the
SAF, a group had to first pass minimal standards and become a
233. Id. Justice Kennedy added a concurrence in which he took issue with the
Court's use of the term "endorsing religion" which he explained "cannot suffice as a rule
of decision consistent with our precedents and our traditions in this part of our jurispru-
dence." Id. at 2149 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas,
concurred and decried the majority's invocation of the Lemon test:
Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave
and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our
Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children.
The secret of the Lemon test's survival, I think, is that it is so easy to kill.
It is there to scare us (and our audience) when we wish it to do so, but we can
command it to return to the tomb at will.
Id. at 2149-50 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Justice Scalia concluded, "I
would hold, simply and clearly, that giving Lamb's Chapel nondiscriminatory access to
school facilities cannot violate [the Establishment Clause] because it does not signify state
or local embrace of a particular religious sect." Id. at 2151. One commentator has noted,
"[a]lthough Lamb's Chapel stands for the proposition that religious groups are entitled to
equal access to school facilities once school districts permit after-hours use of their
property, it does not indicate what religious activities would exceed permissible bounds."
Burgess, supra note 36, at 1983 (citations omitted).
234. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 795 F. Supp. 175, 177
(W.D. Va. 1992).
235. Id.
236. Id.
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Contracted Independent Organization ("CO").2 7  As a CIO, a
group was then given access to University facilities, such as meet-
ing rooms and computer terminals, but received no funding.238
In order to receive funding, a student group was required to
clear a second hurdle: it had to submit a detailed request to the
Student Council in which the group demonstrated its eligibility
under the Student Council's guidelines. 239 A CIO could appeal a
funding denial to the full Student Council and, in the event of a
second denial, to the University's Student Activities Committee
which was chaired by a designee of the Vice President for Student
Affairs. 4°
In 1990, the Petitioners established WAP to publish Wide
Awake.241 WAP acquired CIO status soon after its formation.242
WAP's editors committed the journal to a two-fold mission: (1)
"to challenge Christians to live, in word and deed, according to the
faith they proclaim" and (2) "to encourage students to consider
237. Id.
There are four general criteria for CIO status: (1) at least fifty-one percent of
the group's members must be students; (2) the group's officers must all be full-
time, fee-paying students; (3) the group must keep an updated copy of its con-
stitution on file with the University; and (4) the group must sign an anti-dis-
crimination disclaimer.
Id. at 177 n.1.
238. Id. at 177. A standard agreement between a CIO and the University states that
University benefits provided to the groups "should not be misinterpreted as meaning that
those organizations are part of or controlled by the University, that the University is
responsible for the organizations' contracts or other acts or omissions, or that the Univer-
sity approves of the organizations' goals or activities." Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors
of the Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269, 270-71 (4th Cir. 1994).
239. Rosenberger, 795 F. Supp. at 177. The guidelines prohibit funding for fraterni-
ties and sororities, political and religious organizations, and those groups whose member-
ship is exclusionary in nature. Id. The guidelines similarly prohibit expenditures by
approved groups for: (1) honoraria or similar fees; (2) religious activities; (3) social
entertainment and related expenses; (4) philanthropic contributions and activities; and (5)
political activities. Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 271. The guidelines define a religious orga-
nization as a group "whose purpose is to practice a devotion to an acknowledged ultimate
reality or deity," and a religious activity as an activity "which primarily promotes or
manifests a particular belief(s) in or about a deity or an ultimate reality." Id. at 271 n.2.
240. Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 271.
241. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2515.
242. Id.
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what a personal relationship with Jesus Christ means. 243 As Jus-
tice Souter noted in his dissent, WAP's editors fulfilled their mis-
sion by publishing numerous articles imploring readers to follow
St. Paul's exhortation and accept salvation through Jesus Christ. 244
An example of WAP's contents includes the following passage:
When you get to the final gate, the Lord will be handing
out boarding passes, and He will examine your ticket. If,
in your lifetime, you did not request a seat on His Friendly
Skies Flier by trusting Him and asking Him to be your pi-
lot, then you will not be on His list of reserved seats (and
the Lord will know your not). You will not be able to buy
a ticket then; no amount of money or desire will do the
trick. You will be met by your chosen pilot and flown
straight to Hell on an express jet (without air conditioning
or toilets, of course). 245
In addition, Wide Awake contained articles with messages such as
"'Go into all the world and preach the good news to all creation.'
(Mark 16:15) The Great Commission is the prime-directive for our
lives as Christians .... WAP's editors published three issues
of Wide Awake and distributed approximately 5,000 copies of each
issue free of charge.247
WAP's editors submitted their first and only request for funding
in 1991, seeking reimbursement from the SAF to offset the
$5,862.00 publishing cost for Wide Awake.248 The Student Coun-
cil's appropriation committee denied the request, explaining that
WAP was a religious activity for which the University could not
allocate funding.249 The committee noted, however, that WAP's
CIO status guaranteed the organization full and equal access to
243. Id.
244. Id. at 2534 (Souter, J., dissenting). "The masthead of every issue bears St.
Paul's exhortation, that '[t]he hour has come for you to awake from your slumber, be-
cause our salvation is nearer now than when we first believed. Romans 13:11.' Id.
245. Id. (citations omitted).
246. Id.
247. Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 272.
248. Rosenberger, 795 F. Supp. at 177.
249. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2515.
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University facilities, including the right to distribute issues on cam-
pus. 250 WAP's editors appealed to the full Student Council, argu-
ing that the organization had satisfied the relevant SAF guidelines
and that the denial of funding violated the U.S. Constitution. 251
The Student Council affirmed the funding denial without com-
ment.25 2 WAP's editors next appealed to the University's Student
Activities Committee which, in a letter from Associate Dean Ron-
ald J. Stump, affirmed the two previous decisions.253
B. The District Court
Ronald Rosenberger, as a member of WAP, brought suit against
the University in the Western District of Virginia.25 a He argued
that the SAF's classification of "religious activities" violated
WAP's members' rights under the U.S. Constitution,255 the Virginia
Constitution,256 and the Virginia Act for Religious Freedom.2 7
250. Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 273.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 274.
254. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 795 F. Supp. 175, 178
(W.D.Va. 1992). Rosenberger sought:
(1) a declaratory judgment that the guidelines' prohibition against the funding
of 'religious activities' violated their rights under the United States Constitution,
the Virginia Constitution, and the Virginia Act for Religious Freedom; (2) a
permanent order enjoining the Rector and Visitors from promulgating any
proscription against the funding of [Wide Awake] on the basis of the content or
viewpoint of its members' speech in Wide Awake; (3) compensatory damages
of at least $5,862.00, the sum of SAF funds unconstitutionally denied Wide
Awake Productions; and (4) an order awarding Wide Awake Productions rea-
sonable costs and attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 275.
255. Id. at 274-75 nn.13, 15, 18 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 2 (Free Exercise
Clause); U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 3 (Free Speech and Press Clause); U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV § 1, cl. 4 (Equal Protection Clause)).
256. Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 275 nn. 14, 16, 19 (citing VA. CONST. art. I, § 12, cls.
2, 3 ("any citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects..
. [T]he General Assembly shall not pass any law abridging the freedom of speech or of
the press."); VA. CONST. art. I, § 16, cls. 2, 6 ("all men are equally entitled to the free
exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience .... [The General Assem-
bly] shall not ... confer any peculiar privileges or advantages on any sect or denomina-
tion .... "); VA. CONST. art. I, § 11, cl. 3 ("the right to be free from any governmental
discrimination upon the basis of religious conviction, race, color, sex, or national origin
shall not be abridged .....
257. Id. at 275 n.17 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 57-1 (Michie 1985 & Supp. 1993)).
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Count one of Rosenberger's complaint alleged that the guidelines
resulted in the SAF's denial of funding which unlawfully: (1)
deprived WAP's members of government benefits solely due to
their viewpoint, and (2) excluded WAP's members from the SAF's
limited public forum.258 Count two argued that the University's
denial discriminated against WAP's members based on their reli-
gious beliefs and expression in Wide Awake.259 Count three main-
tained that the guidelines denied WAP's members benefits which
other students and CIOs-including those engaged in other reli-
gious speech and activities-had received.260 Both Rosenberger
and the University moved for summary judgment as the issues
were of Constitutional interpretation, not material fact.261
The district court ruled for the University on all three counts.262
First, the court held that the SAF constituted a non-public forum,263
rather than a limited public forum. 2 4 The court found the funding
denial to be reasonable based on the University's explanations that
it: (1) had limited funds to disburse, and (2) sought to obey the
federal and state constitutional mandates of neutrality towards reli-
gion.265  The court distinguished the present case from Widmar,
finding a difference between funding and access.266 The court
noted that "[t]he present case might very well be resolved in [the
258. Id. at 274.
259. Id. at 275.
260. Id.
261. Rosenberger, 795 F. Supp. at 178.
262. Id. at 178-84.
263. Id. at 181. A "nonpublic forum" exists when there is "public property which
is not 'by tradition or designation a forum for public communication."' Id. at 178 (quot-
ing Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)). The
government may limit access to such a forum through restrictions so long as they are
"reasonable and are not an effort to suppress expression merely because the public offi-
cials oppose the speaker's view." id. at 178 (citations omitted).
264. Id. at 178-81. A limited public forum is property "which the state has opened
for use by the public even if it was not required to create the forum in the first place."
Id. at 178 (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 45). "A state may only restrict access to limited
public fora if such a restriction is narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state inter-
est." Id. (citation omitted).
265. Id. at 181.
266. Id.
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plaintiffs] favor if the University had denied CIO status to
WAP. 267 Consequently, the court held that the guidelines did not
result in content or viewpoint discrimination.268 In addition, the
district court noted that the University's effort to avoid an Estab-
lishment Clause violation constituted a compelling state interest
which outweighed the minimal burden placed on WAP's members'
free exercise of religion.269  Finally, the court rejected
Rosenberger's Equal Protection Claims on the grounds that there
was no evidence that the University intended to discriminate
against WAP.270
C. The Fourth Circuit
Rosenberger appealed the SAF guidelines' prohibition on the
funding of "religious activities" to the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit.27  First, he argued that the proscription denied
government benefits to WAP's members based on their viewpoint,
thus violating their Free Speech rights.272 Second, he contended
that the guidelines discriminated against WAP's members in con-
travention of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment271 in two ways: (1) the guidelines denied WAP's members
benefits which other CIOs engaged in religious speech received,
and (2) the guidelines neither served a compelling state interest nor
were narrowly tailored enough to avoid entanglement concerns
267. Id.
268. Id. 181-82. The court pointed to Justice Stevens' Widmar concurrence: "In
performing their learning and teaching missions, the managers of a university routinely
make countless decisions based on the content of communicative materials .... [In
encouraging students to participate in extracurricular activities, they necessarily make
decisions concerning the content of those activities." Id. at 182 (quoting Widmar, 454
U.S. at 278 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
269. Id. at 182-83.
270. Id. at 183.
271. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269, 276-77 (4th
Cir. 1994). The court explained that as neither party subsequently litigated the district
court's grant of summary judgment with respect to the state-law theories of recovery, the
court would consider the claims abandoned and therefore would not disturb the lower
court's holdings. Id. at 276 (citing Shopco Distrib. Co. v. Commanding Gen., 885 F.2d
167, 170 n.3 (4th Cir. 1989)).
272. Id. at 277.
273. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1, cl. 4 ("No state shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
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without infringing upon WAP's fundamental rights.274
The Fourth Circuit first examined the alleged violation of the
Free Speech and Press Clause. 75 The Court explained that while
the First Amendment prohibits government encroachment on the
rights of expression, the Free Speech Clause is not a promise that
the federal government will subsidize "every garrulous member of
the American populace. 276 The court noted, however, that when
the government chooses to subsidize speech, funding decisions
based on the content of a speaker's message are impermissible.277
The court found that the SAF was an open forum and that the
guidelines discriminated against WAP's members by forcing them
either to discontinue their constitutionally protected religious ex-
pression or forgo funding.27 Consequently, the court held that the
guidelines violated the Free Speech Clause.279
In order to sustain the guidelines, however, the court inquired
whether the University's regulations: (1) served a compelling state
274. Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 277.
275. Id. Rather than reinitiate the limited public forum vs. nonpublic forum dichoto-
my, the court chose to analyze the case at bar "under the line of authority dealing with
content-based discrimination relating to government-generated benefits or burdens." Id.
at 287. The 6ourt explained that the public forum cases "have taken 'forum' in a fairly
literalistic way involving physical space, and we do not see how it advances the jurispru-
dence to wrench that word out of its accepted form to encompass this type of case already
subject to First Amendment scrutiny." Id.
276. Id. at 277. The court noted that the University had accorded WAP's members
full access to University facilities in accordance with Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277, and that
access precluded the petitioners from making a claim that the University placed a "per
se unconstitutional prior restraint upon their freedom actually to speak or to publish their
views by denying them equal access to University facilities." Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at
278. Similarly, the court explained that, had the University chosen not to fund any
extracurricular activities, WAP would have no cause of action. Id. (construing Healy v.
Jones, 408 U.S. 169, 182 n.8 (1972)). Rosenberger thus based his cause of action on the
claim that "once the Rector and Visitors have chosen to promulgate guidelines governing
the allocation of funds that support student speech among competing student interests,
such guidelines cannot condition funding awards on the content or viewpoint of a pro-
spective recipient's speech." Id. at 279.
277. Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 280-81 (citing a number of cases supporting this propo-
sition including Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 382 (1985) and Everson
v. Board of Educ. of Ewing Twnshp., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947)).
278. Id. at 281.
279. Id.
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interest, and (2) were narrowly tailored to achieve that end.280 To
make such a determination, the court applied the Lemon test281
examining whether avoiding the creation of an establishment of
religion at the University constituted a compelling interest.282 First,
the court held that the University's decision to deny government
subsidies to religious groups was not motivated by an impermissi-
ble purpose.283 Second, the Court explained that the guidelines did
not inhibit religion because WAP's members had full access to the
University's facilities and thus could inject their ideas into the
community-wide debate.284 The Court noted, however, that funding
WAP would constitute state sponsorship of religious belief.285
In addition, the court held that government aid to a pervasively
sectarian journal would result in excessive entanglement between
government and religion.286 The court explained that funding WAP
would send "an unmistakably clear signal that the [University]
supports Christian values and wishes to promote the wide promul-
gation of such values. 287 The court differentiated between inciden-
tal28 and direct28 9 government subsidies to religious institutions and
280. Id. (citations omitted).
281. Id. at 282. In a footnote, the Court stated that although it realized that a num-
ber of Supreme Court Justices were opposed to a continued application of the Lemon test,
e.g. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. 2141 (Scalia, J., concurring), "the three-pronged Lemon
test ... is the only coherent [Establishment Clause] test a majority of the Court has ever
adopted .... For purposes of the Establishment Clause question presented here, there-
fore, we are bound to consider Lemon governing precedent." Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at
282-83 n.30 (citations omitted).
282. Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 282 (construing Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271).
283. Id. at 283-84. The court noted that SAF's goal was to provide support for
student organizations related to the University's educational purpose and that the Universi-
ty could thus exclude Wide Awake. Id.
284. Id. at 285.
285. Id. at 285-86. The court explained that government support of a publication so
clearly engaged in the propagation of religious doctrine would constitute an Establishment
Clause violation. Id. at 285.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 286.
288. The court cited Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. 2462, Widmar, 454 U.S. 263, and Commit-
tee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), to explain that
when the government creates an open forum to which all groups are invited, sectarian
organizations may receive government grants as the state may not discriminate against
such groups based on the content of their speech. Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 286.
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found that funding WAP would initiate competition for subsidies
among religious groups.290 The court held that the regulations were
narrowly tailored because the guidelines' prohibition of funding
religious activities applied to all religions.291
Finally, the court upheld the district court's grant of summary
judgment on the Equal Protection Claim explaining that there was
no evidence on the record that discriminatory intent motivated the
University to deny funding to WAP.292 Rosenberger subsequently
appealed to the Supreme Court.
D. The Supreme Court
1. The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court's majority opinion, written by Justice Ken-
293 AR enedy, approached Rosenberger as a potential Free Speech viola-
tion rather than as an Establishment Clause violation.294 The Court
289. Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 286 ("Direct monetary subsidization of religious organi-
zations and projects, however, is a beast of an entirely different color.").
290. Id. The court noted that "[tihe possibility of a continuing annual appropriation
for the benefit of a single religion carries the potential for seriously divisive political
consequences at the [University]." Id. The court, following Everson, looked to history
to explain that civil strife often resulted when religious sects competed in order to attain
political and religious supremacy through the support of government. Id. (construing
Everson, 330 U.S. at 8-9).
291. Id. at 286-87.
292. Id. at 288. Under Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976), a plaintiff
must show both discriminatory intent and disparate impact. The record did not contain
evidence of discriminatory intent and the court did not consider the question of disparate
impact. Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 288.
293. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices Scalia, O'Connor and Thomas joined the
majority. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2513
(1995).
294. Id. at 2516; see also id. at 2525 ("There is no Establishment Clause violation
in the University's honoring its duties under the Free Speech Clause."). But cf. infra part
II.D.4 (Justice Souter's dissenting opinion holds the Establishment Clause violation dis-
positive). The Court granted certiorari on the question: "Whether the Establishment
Clause compels a state university to exclude an otherwise eligible student publication
from participation in the student activities fund, solely on the basis of its religious view-
point, where such exclusion would violate the Speech and Press Clauses if the viewpoint
of the publication were nonreligious." Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2521. One commenta-
tor remarked:
Particularly noteworthy is the Court's reliance on free speech grounds and free
speech doctrines. If the publication singled out to be denied a subsidy had dealt
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began, by. noting that "the government may not regulate speech
based on its substantive content or the message it conveys."295
Citing.R.A.V., the Court explained that when the government tar-
gets a particular speaker's viewpoint rather than a general subject
matter, the First Amendment violation is "all the more blatant. 2 96
The Court noted that the government has the right to preserve its
own property,297 but must make only reasonable exclusions once it
opens a limited public forum.
298
Arguing that the SAF is a forum "more in a metaphysical than
in a spatial or geographic sense," the Court compared the present
case to Lamb's Chapel.299 The Court noted that, in Lamb's Chapel,
the government could not prohibit sectarian entities from gaining
access to government facilities.3°° The Court applied this principle
to Rosenberger and explained that, although the SAF did not physi-
cally exclude religious speakers, it impermissibly disfavored student
organizations with religious viewpoints. °t Similarly, the Court
with a political message or had undertaken to criticize the teaching in the Eng-
lish Department . . there is no doubt that the Court's analysis in terms of
impermissible viewpoint bias would have raised hardly a murmur. But the
publication here was religious, and the Establishment Clause was invoked to
raise possibly competing constitutional values.
Charles Freid, Foreward: Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 13, 68-69 (1995).
295. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2516 (citing Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96).
296. Id. ("Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimina-
tion. The government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating
ideology... is the rationale for the restriction.") (construing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377 (1992)); see also supra notes 188-202 and accompanying text (discussing
the Court's opinion in R.A.V.).
297. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2516 (construing Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at
2146).
298. Id. at 2516-17 (construing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund,
Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 804-06 (1985)). The Court further explained that in order to deter-
mine whether the state's exclusion of a class of speech is legitimate, it must differentiate
between content discrimination "which may be permissible if it preserves the purposes
of that limited forum," and viewpoint discrimination "which is presumed impermissible
when directed against speech otherwise within the forum's limitations." Id. at 2517.
299. Id. (construing Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993)); see supra notes 225-33
and accompanying text (discussing the Court's holding in Lamb's Chapel).
300. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2517 (construing Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at
2145).
301. Id. The Court drew parallels between the fact patterns of Rosenberger and
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applied Widmar302 and concluded that when the SAF reimbursed
third-party contractors on behalf of private speakers, the University
could not silence selected viewpoints. 30 3 Finally, the Court rejected
the University's attempt to economically distinguish access from
funding. °4 Instead, the Court explained that the University could
not justify otherwise impermissible viewpoint discrimination based
on scarcity. 3 5 For these reasons, the Court held that the guide-
lines' impermissible effect of limiting the petitioner's free speech
Lamb's Chapel. See id. at 2518. The Court noted that: (1) both WAP and the church
group in Lamb's Chapel "would have been qualified as a social or civic organization,
save for [their] religious purposes"; and (2) both the University and the school district
"pointed to nothing but the religious views of the group as the rationale for excluding its
message ..... Id.
In addition, the Court criticized the dissent which maintained that no viewpoint
discrimination existed because the guidelines prohibited funding for all religious speech.
Id. The Court explained that this assertion "reflects an insupportable assumption that all
debate is bipolar and that anti-religious speech is the only response to religious speech."
Id. Instead, the Court held that inclusion of both theistic and atheistic viewpoints is
constitutionally mandated by the Free Speech Clause in order to avoid skewing the de-
bate. Id.
302. 454 U.S. 263 (1981); see supra notes 205-14 and accompanying text (discussing
the Court's holding in Widmar).
303. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2519. The Court was responding to the University's
citation of Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), and Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263
(1981), for the proposition that a public university has discretion in determining the
allocation of funding. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2518-19. The Court explained that in
both Rust and Widmar, the government was distributing "public funds to private entities
to convey a governmental message," and thus could "take legitimate and appropriate steps
to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee." Id. at 2519.
In Rosenberger, however, the University created the SAF as a forum to encourage a
diverse exchange of ideas from a range of private speakers. Id. In such a case, the Court
held, the University could not prohibit speech based on the speakers' viewpoints. Id.
(citations omitted).
304. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2519-20. The University argued that the "funding
of speech differs from provision of access to facilities because money is scarce and
physical facilities are not." Id. at 2519.
305. Id. at 2519-20. The court explained:
Had the meeting rooms in Lamb's Chapel been scarce, had the demand been
greater than the supply, our decision would have been no different. It would
have been incumbent on the State, of course, to ration or allocate the scarce
resources on some acceptable neutral principle; but nothing in our decision
indicated that scarcity would give the State the right to exercise viewpoint
discrimination that is otherwise impermissible.
Id. at 2519-20.
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mandated that they be struck down.3"
The Court next considered the potential Establishment Clause
violation. 3°7 It began by announcing that the general principle
controlling adjudication under the Establishment Clause was neu-
trality. 308 The Court cited Everson and its progeny3°9 for the propo-
sition that when the government follows neutral criteria and distrib-
utes aid in an even-handed manner, the list of recipients can in-
clude religious entities.310 The Court, reasoning that the SAF's
purpose was to create a forum of diverse viewpoints at the Univer-
sity, noted that the government program at issue was neutral to-
wards religion.3 Consequently, it held that the University could
subsidize Wide Awake as a journal of student expression rather than
as a forum for Christian viewpoints.31 2 The Court distinguished the
SAF from a tax directly levied for the support of a church by ex-
plaining that the students paid the fee in order to subsidize all stu-
dent expression regardless of its viewpoint.313 A forbidden tax,
306. Id. at 2520. The Court explained that the two vital First Amendment speech
principles at stake were the dangers in: (1) "granting the State the power to examine
publications to determine whether or not they are based on some ultimate idea and if so
for the State to classify them"; and (2) the chilling effect this process would have on
individual thought and expression. Id. The Court stated that the second was particularly
dangerous in a university setting because of its role at the center of intellectual thought.
Id. The Court explained that the guidelines' prohibition on funding publications that
"primarily promote or manifest a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate
reality," had the potential, if read broadly to exclude essays from Karl Marx, Bertrand
Russell, and John-Paul Sartre. Id. ("Plato could contrive perhaps to submit an acceptable
essay on making pasta or peanut butter cookies, provided he did not point out their
(necessary) imperfections.").
307. Id. at 2520. The Court noted "[tihat the University itself no longer presses the
Establishment Clause claim is some indication that it lacks force; but as the Court of
Appeals rested its judgment on the point and our dissenting colleagues would find it
determinative, it must be addressed." Id. at 2521.
308. Id.
309. id. at 2521-22 (citing Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist. v.
Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Serv. for the Blind, 474
U.S. 481 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983)).
310. Id.
311. Id. at 2522 ("'There is no suggestion that the University created [the SAF] to
advance religion or adopted some ingenious device with the purpose of aiding a religious
cause.").
312. Id.
313. Id. The Court, relying on Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990), chose
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however, would collect money for the sole purpose of directly
supporting a sectarian institution and would therefore violate the
Establishment Clause.31 4 The government's neutrality was further
illustrated by the fact that the University had specifically disassoci-
ated itself from WAP's speech.31 5 The Court reasoned that there
was no Establishment Clause violation because WAP's speech was
private and no student would reasonably believe that the University
supported the religious message.31 6
The Court next addressed the principle which the dissent and
lower courts deemed controlling: 3 7 that the Establishment Clause
precluded the University from making direct money payments to
sectarian institutions.318 The Court explained that it was significant
that no public funds ever reached WAP; instead the University paid
the printer directly.1 9 In fact, the Court noted that when the State
grants access to a sectarian institution, the government must pay for
general costs such as air-conditioning and heating, as well as costs
specific to the enterprise. 320 Accordingly, the Court compared the
University funding WAP to Widmar and Lamb's Chapel where
not to reach the question of whether an objecting student has a "First Amendment right
to demand a pro rata return to the extent the fee is expended for speech to which he or
she does not subscribe." Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2522. In addition, the Court ex-
plained that the CIOs could only withdraw money from the SAF for purposes within the
University's educational mission which "is a far cry from a general public assessment
designed and effected to provide financial support for a church." Id.
314. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2522.
315. Id. at 2523.
316. Id. at 2522-23 (citing Pinette v. Capitol Square Rev. and Advisory Bd., 115 S.
Ct. 2440, 2448 (1995)). Similarly, the Court argued that there was little chance of coer-
cion or endorsement. Id. (citing Lee v. Weissman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992)).
317. Rosenberger, 795 F. Supp. at 183; 18 F.3d at 286-87; 115 S. Ct. at 2538
(Souter, J., dissenting).
318. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2523.
319. Id. ("We do not confront a case where, even under a neutral program that
includes nonsectarian recipients, the government is making direct money payments to an
institution or group that is engaged in religious activity.").
320. Id. The Court questioned the dissent by arguing that the focus should not be
on the fact that money is being spent by the government; rather it should be on the nature
of the benefit received. See id. Any less, the Court concluded, would force the Court to
overrule Widmar, Mergens and Lamb's Chapel, for in each case the government's grant
of access to private organizations resulted in the spending of government funds. Id.
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school districts provided religious organizations with access to
classrooms. a2' The Court thus concluded that a public school may
either operate a facility to which students have access, or pay a
third-party contractor to operate the facility on its behalf.
322
Finally, the Court noted that if the dissenting opinion became
law, the Court would be required to scrutinize the content of poten-
tially religious speech to determine whether the speaker could re-
ceive government funding.323 Such a process, the majority argued,
would raise the specter of government censorship and would place
the Court in a position for which its competence was question-
able.324 Consequently, the Court concluded "[t]here is no Establish-
ment Clause violation in the University's honoring its duties under
the Free Speech Clause. 325
2. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence
Justice O'Connor explained that the Rosenberger controversy
was at the intersection of two fundamental principles of constitu-
tional adjudication: government neutrality towards the free ex-
change of ideas and the prohibition of state funding of religious
activities.326 In instances when such bedrock principles conflict,
O'Connor explained, it is not possible to resolve the conundrum by
relying on categorical rules; instead, a judge must sift through the
details of the case and determine whether the challenged program
offends the Establishment Clause.327 Justice O'Connor explained
that the Court's role is to draw lines based on the.situation because
such a process allows the Court to reach the correct result.328 She
321. Id.
322. Id. at 2524. The Court concluded that the benefits accorded to WAP were
incidental to "the government's provision of secular services for secular purposes," as
printing is a general necessity of student life. id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 2525.
326. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
327. Id. at 2525-26.
328. Id. at 2526 ("Neither are we troubled by the question where to draw the line.
That is the question in pretty much everything worth arguing in the law. Day and night,
youth and age are only types.") (citations omitted). O'Connor's explanation plausibly was
in direct response to the majority's closing contention that the Court should not categorize
speech. See id. at 2524-25 (Opinion of the Court) (arguing that the Court should not be
in the role of scrutinizing speech).
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noted that in both Witters3 29 and Everson330 the Court undertook the
proper analysis and decided the case based on the facts on the
record.331
Justice O'Connor identified four specific considerations which
led her to conclude that subsidizing Wide Awake would not consti-
tute government endorsement of the journal's religious message.332
First, she explained that any reader of Wide Awake would realize
that the publication was independent from the University.33 This
was because the CIO agreement: (1) stated that all student organi-
zations were independent of the University, and (2) required all
funded publications to contain a disclaimer explicitly stating that
University was in no way responsible for the organization.334 Sec-
ond, the SAF's procedure for distributing financial assistance en-
sured that the money would only be used for permissible purpos-
es.335 Third, the SAF funded many other organizations, thus mak-
329. 474 U.S. 481 (1986). Justice O'Connor explained that the Court in Witters
"resolved the conflict between the neutrality principle and the funding prohibition, not by
permitting one. to trump the other, but by relying on the elements of choice peculiar to
the facts of that case .. " Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2526 (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment) (construing Witters, 474 U.S. at 493). She noted that
the Court in Witters allowed a sectarian organization to receive government funds be-
cause: (1) the aid to religion was the result of a petitioner's private choice, and (2) no
reasonable observer could infer that the State was endorsing a religious practice or belief.
Id. (construing Witters, 474 U.S. at 493).
330. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Justice O'Connor remarked that the Everson decision
"reflected the need to rely on careful judgment-not simple categories-when two princi-
ples, of equal historical and jurisprudential pedigree, come into unavoidable conflict."
Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2526 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
331. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2526.
332. Id. at 2526-27.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 2527. Justice O'Connor noted that in order for a student organization to
receive financial assistance, it had to submit disbursement requests for the SAF's approv-
al; in the event that the SAF agreed that funding the organization comport with its guide-
lines, it payed the funds directly to the third party vendor (such as the printer in
Rosenberger). Id. At no time, therefore, did any funding go directly to the organization's
coffers. Id. O'Connor found this relevant because it ensured that any government fund-
ing to WAP was "used only to further the University's purpose in maintaining a free and
robust marketplace of ideas .... Id. Furthermore, this limitation made the case "analo-
gous to a school providing equal access to a generally available printing press (or other
physical facilities), and unlike a block grant to religious organizations." id. (citations
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ing it unlikely that any student would perceive that the University
endorsed WAP's message.3 36 Finally, Justice O'Connor noted that
an objecting student could challenge the SAF for compelling him
or her to pay for speech with which he or she disagrees.337 Subject
to these factors, Justice O'Connor joined the majority's decision
that the University had violated Rosenberger's Free Speech rights
by denying funding based on Wide Awake's content.338
3. Justice Thomas' Concurrence
Justice Thomas announced that while he fully agreed with the
majority, he wrote separately in order to challenge the dissent's
historical analysis.339 He explained that the guiding principle in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is neutrality towards religion;
the government is free to aid religion so long as it does not prefer
one faith over another.34 Consequently, Justice Thomas posited
omitted).
336. Id; There were fifteen other magazines and newspapers at the University which
contained a "wide array of non-religious, anti-religious and competing religious view-
points in the forum . I..." d  Justice O'Connor differentiated this case from Pinnette,
"where religious speech threaten[ed] to dominate the forum." Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct.
at 2527 (construing Pinette, 115 S. Ct. at 2451 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
337. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2527
338. Id. at 2528. O'Connor noted that:
The Court's decision today therefore neither trumpets the supremacy of the
neutrality principle nor signals the demise of the funding prohibition in the
Establishment Clause jurisprudence .... When bedrock principles collide, they.
test the limits of categorical obstinacy and expose the flaws and dangers of a
Grand Unified Theory that may turn out to be neither grand nor unified.
Id.
339. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). As the purpose of this Comment is not to examine
the historical underpinnings of both the majority and dissent, but rather to analyze doctrin-
al shifts in Rosenberger, this Comment will extract only the guiding principles from the
Thomas-Souter debate.
340. Id. at 2528-29; see also ROBERT CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE:
HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION 20-23 (1982); Rodney K. Smith, Getting Off
on the Wrong Foot and Back on Again: A Reexamination of the History of the Framing
of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and a Critique of the Reynolds and
Everson Decisions, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 569, 590-91 (1984). Justice Thomas
examined the alternate view, as espoused in Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to
Religion: A False Claim about Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875 (1986), that
"the Establishment Clause forbids not only government preferences for some religious
sects over others, but also government preferences for religion over irreligion."
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that sectarian organizations may participate on equal footing with
their secular counterparts in all neutral government programs.341
Furthermore, he explained that the government could not differenti-
ate between allowing religious entities access to facilities and
funds.342 Justice Thomas thus concluded that the SAF was com-
pelled to allow WAP to compete with all other student organiza-
tions for State aid.343
4. Justice Souter's Dissent
Justice Souter, in his dissent joined by Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Breyer,344 began by noting that the dispositive issue
was not whether the University violated Rosenberger's Free Speech
rights, but instead whether the University could fund WAP without
violating the Establishment Clause.345 Justice Souter analyzed Wide
Awake's articles and showed the publication to be not a journal
from a religious perspective, but rather a "straightforward exhorta-
tion to enter into a relationship with G-d as revealed in Jesus Christ
.... It is nothing other than the preaching of the word, which.
* . is what most branches of Christianity offer those called to the
religious life. 346 He explained, however, that the Establishment
Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2529 (citations omitted). Justice Thomas rejected Laycock's
explanation and instead found "much to commend [in] the former view." Id.
341. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2532. Thomas further noted that the Establishment
Clause "does not compel the exclusion of religious groups from government benefits
programs that are- generally available to a broad class of participants." Id. (citations
omitted).
342. Id. at 2531. This was in response to the dissent's contention that access and
funding for religious entities constitutes different questions. See id. at 2545-46 (Souter,
J., dissenting). Justice Thomas applied the dissent's no-aid principle to include the possi-
bility that a church would not receive aid from the fire or police departments and thus
concluded that "[i]f churches may benefit on equal terms with other groups [for aid from
the fire department] they may also benefit on equal terms [at the University]." Id. at
2532.
343. Id. at 2533.
344. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
345. Id. at 2533-34.
346. Id. at 2534-35 (citations omitted) (alteration added). Souter noted:
These are not the words of "student news, information, opinion, entertainment,
or academic communicatio[n]..." (in the language of the University's funding
criterion) but the words of "challenge [to] Christians to live, in word and deed,
according to the faith they proclaim and ... to consider what a personal rela-
tionship with Jesus Christ means" (in the language of [Wide Awake's] founder).
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Clause prohibits the use of public funds to subsidize religious
proselytization.347 In addition, he noted that where the Court al-
lowed funding to an institution with both secular and sectarian
functions, it sought an assurance that the activities were separated
and that funding reached only the secular branch and not the reli-
gious.348 He posited that the majority failed to apply the aforemen-
tioned principles due to its belief that WAP's mission was merely
to provide a point of view rather than to proselytize. 349 As a result,
Justice Souter concluded that the majority correctly stated a body
of law regarding government funding of religious entities, but ulti-
mately misapplied it.350
Justice Souter next explained that when a sectarian organization
applied for government funding, a reviewing judge must look be-
yond the program's neutrality and ensure that State funds do not
support a core religious activity. Justice Souter explained that
evenhandedness was relevant, however, on the margins of the Es-
tablishment Clause where the activity was not a core religious
function. 2 He reasoned that cases such as Mueller,353 Witters,354
The subject is not the discourse of the scholar's study or the seminar room, but
of the evangelist's mission station and the pulpit.
Id. (citations omitted).
347. Id. at 2535. Justice Souter subsequently employed sources such as James
Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments to explain the
historical grounding of the principle against direct government funding of religion. Id.
at 2535-36. Justice Thomas wrote to counter this analysis. Id. at 2528 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
348. Id. at 2539 (construing, among others, Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 614-
15 (1988) (upholding ALFA on the ground that funds cannot be used by the grantees in
a way as to advance religion); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736,
746-48, 755, 759-61 (1976) (plurality opinion) (upholding general aid program restricting
funds for secular activities only); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 742-45 (1973) (uphold-
ing general revenue program excluding facilities used for religious purposes)).
349. Id. at 2539-40.
350. Id. at 2540.
351. Id. ("[T]he Establishment Clause forbids a State from hiding behind the applica-
tion of formally neutral criteria and remaining studiously oblivious to the effects of its
actions .... [N]ot all State policies are permissible under the Religion Clauses simply
because they are neutral in form") (citing Pinette, 115 S. Ct. at 2440 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
352. Id. at 2540-41. Justice Souter included the following types of neutral govern-
ment programs as acceptable: "Would it be wrong to put out fires in burning churches,
wrong to pay the bus fares of students on the way to parochial schools, wrong to allow
a grantee of special education funds to spend them at a religious college?" Id. at 2541.
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and Zobrest,355 support the proposition that the neutrality of the
government program was not dispositive; instead, the Court found
it relevant that the funding reached the religious organizations as
a result of personal choice on the part of the third party recipient. 6
Justice Souter therefore concluded that the University's guidelines
reflected these core principles of Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence.357
Justice Souter subsequently proposed three rationales why Uni-
versity payments to the printer rather than to WAP nonetheless
constituted impermissible government sponsorship of religion. 8
First, he explained that there was no difference between funding
the printer or WAP.359  He noted that in Witters, Mueller, and
Zobrest, the Court found the government programs constitutional
because the money reached the religious organization solely as a
result of the independent third party's choice.3 ° In the present
case, however, the printer could only apply the funds towards Wide
Awake's printing costs and did not have discretion to use the Uni-
versity's money for any other purpose. 36' He thus concluded that
He explained that funding such activities in no way promotes the core religious functions
of any such religious organization. Id.
353. 463 U.S. 388 (1983); see also supra notes 147-53 and accompanying text
(discussing Mueller case).
354. 474 U.S. 481 (1986); see also supra notes 154-60 and accompanying text
(discussing Witters case).
355. 509 U.S. 1 (1993); see also supra notes 161-67 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Zobrest case).
356. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2541-42 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Thus, our holdings
in these cases were little more than extensions of the unremarkable proposition that 'a
State may issue a paycheck to one of its employees, who may then donate all or part of
that paycheck to a religious institution, all without religious barrier . ) (citations
omitted).
357. Id. at 2544 ("[T]he University perfectly understood the primacy of the no-direct
funding rule over the evenhandedness principle when it drew the line short of funding
'any activity which primarily promotes or manifests a particular belief(s) in or about a
deity or an ultimate reality.' App. to Pet. for Cert., 66a.").
358. Id. at 2544-47.
359. Id. at 2544-45.
360. Id. at 2544.
361. Id. at 2545 ("The formalism of distinguishing between payment to [Wide
Awake] so it can pay an approved bill and payment of the approved bill itself cannot be
the basis of a decision of Constitutional law.").
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Witters and its progeny did not apply as, given the structure of the
University's payments, the government directly subsidized a core
religious function.362
Second, Justice Souter questioned the majority's application of
Widmar, Mergens, and Lamb's Chapel.363 He explained that these
cases were justified by the rationale that the government cannot
deny a speaker, solely based on the content of his or her speech,
use of the proverbial street corner.3 " Such cases were not applica-
ble to the issue of funding, however, because access to a street
corner is not analogous to a grant of government benefits; indeed,
such an extension would provide new economic benefits to reli-
gious organizations despite the prohibition on direct aid.365 Finally,
notwithstanding his belief that the SAF constituted a tax, Justice
Souter explained that the corrupting effect of government support
did not turn on whether the Government's own money was derived
from taxation or gift or the sale of public lands.366  He thus con-
cluded that the majority's decision forcing the University to pro-
362. Id.
363. Id. at 2545-46.
364. Id. at 2546. Justice Souter noted that there were limitations to the Lamb's
Chapel rationale:
The religious speaker's use of the room passed muster as an incident of a plan
to facilitate speech generally for a secular purpose .... But each case drew
ultimately on unexceptionable Speech Clause doctrine treating the evangelist,
the Salvation Army, the millennialist or the Hare Krishna like any other speaker
in a public forum. It was the preservation of free speech on the model of the
street comer that supplied the justification going beyond the requirement of
evenhandedness.
Id. at 2545-46 (Souter, J., dissenting).
365. Id. at 2546.
366. Id. at 2547. Justice Souter was responding to Justices Kennedy and O'Connor
whom he believed to have recast the scope of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 2546-47.
In particular, he was critical of Justice O'Connor's attempt to distinguish Rosenberger
from Establishment Clause precedent on the grounds that the prohibition on direct aid did
not apply to the SAF because the University's fund was not a tax and was thus outside
the purview of the Establishment Clause. Id. He noted that whether or not the fund
constituted a tax was not the issue; rather, the Court must determine whether any govem-
ment program violated either of the dual objectives of the Establishment Clause which
are to "protect individuals and their republics from the destructive consequences of mix-
ing government and religion [and] to protect religion from a corrupting dependence on
support from the Government." Id. at 2547 (citations omitted).
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vide WAP with government funding violated the Establishment
Clause.367
In the second part of his dissent, Justice Souter explained that
while the Establishment Clause prohibited WAP's funding, he felt
compelled to comment on the majority's Free Speech analysis.368
He explained that the Court's prohibition on viewpoint discrimina-
tion was designed to prevent the government from "skewing public
debate. 369 Such discrimination occurs when the government al-
lows one speaker to express his views, but prohibits others who
would naturally be expected to respond.370 Justice Souter found
that the University was not engaging in such discrimination be-
cause the guidelines excluded all speech manifesting a belief in an
ultimate deity; this prohibition applied to all religions as well as to
anyone (such as agnostics and deists) who might take a viewpoint
on a religious issue.37' He thus concluded that the guidelines did
not skew the debate either for or against religion.372 Finally, he
367. Id.
368. Id. Justice Souter noted:
Given the dispositive effect of the Establishment Clause's bar to funding [Wide
Awake], there should be no need to decide whether in the absence of this bar
the University would violate the Free Speech Clause by limiting funding as it
has done .... But the Court's speech analysis may have independent applica-
tion, and its flaws should not pass unremarked.
Id. (citation omitted).
369. id. at 2548.
370. Id. at 2549. Justice Souter argued that the government cannot aid only one side
in a public debate, for "if the government assists those espousing one point of view,
neutrality requires it to assist those espousing opposing points of view, as well." Id.
371. Id. at 2549-50. Justice Souter explained that if the guidelines were either
written or applied solely to deny funding for (1) evangelical Christian organizations, or
(2) organized religions (such as Muslims, Jews, and Buddhists as well as Christians), it
would skew the debate in favor of agnostics and deists. Id. at 2549. The guidelines,
however, denied funding to'any group that manifests a belief "about" a deity or ultimate
reality, and thus excluded funding of the entire subject of religion. Id.
372. Id. at 2550. Justice Souter took issue with the Court's statement that the regula-
tions would stifle student thought by allowing the University to ban funding. Id. at 2549-
50. While Justice Souter did not expect that the regulations would be interpreted as
broadly as the Court had prophesied, Justice Souter noted that such an application would
not constitute viewpoint discrimination because:
If a University wished to fund no speech beyond the subjects of pasta and
cookie preparation, it surely would not be discriminating on the basis of some-
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distinguished the present case from Lamb's Chapel by explaining
that the regulations in Lamb's Chapel banned religious speech,
while allowing its anti-religious counterpart. 373 The SAF's guide-
lines, however, prohibited University sponsorship for all sides in-
volved in the religious debate.374 Consequently, Justice Souter
noted that he would have upheld the Guidelines under a Free
Speech analysis as well.375
II. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE UPHELD THE
UNIVERSITY'S DETERMINATION THAT FUNDING WAP
VIOLATED THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE'S MANDATED
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
The Supreme Court's decision to apply a content neutral Free
Speech analysis in Rosenberger reflected its acceptance of
accommodationism and fundamentally undermined the Establish-
ment Clause's guarantees.376 Consequently, the Court held that the
government, when operating a neutral entitlement program, must
subsidize all eligible organizations, including religious entities.377
Conversely, Justice Souter's decision to employ an Establishment
Clause analysis reflected his adherence to separationism as a guid-
ing principle in adjudicating First Amendment disputes.378 As dis-
one's viewpoint, at least absent some controversial claim that pasta and cookies
did not exist. The upshot would be an instructional universe without higher
education, but not a universe where one viewpoint was enriched above its
competitors.
Id. at 2550.
373. Id. (construing Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2144).
374. Id. ("If [the SAF's guidelines amount] to viewpoint discrimination, the Court
has all but eviscerated the line between viewpoint and content.").
375. Id. at 2550-51.
376. See id. at 2513-25; see also supra part II.D.1 (discussing the Court's opinion
in Rosenberger); supra part I.A.l.b (discussing accommodationism).
377. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2521-22 (holding that the University must fund
WAP because the SAF was a neutral government program which distributed aid in an
evenhanded manner); see also Bila, supra note 94, at 1549 (explaining that
accommodationists believe that religious institutions may receive government funds from
a neutral government program).
378. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2533-51; see also supra part II.D.4 (discussing
Justice Souter's dissenting opinion in Rosenberger); supra part I.A.l.a (discussing
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cussed below, this Comment argues that it is only through Justice
Souter's approach, and not the Court's, that the Supreme Court will
ensure the vitality of the Establishment Clause's "wall of separa-
tion" between church and State.379
A. The Court's Opinion Fails to Ensure an Adequate
Separation of Church and State as Guaranteed by the
Establishment Clause
The Court's holding in Rosenberger eliminated many of the
fundamental protections afforded by the Establishment Clause. °
The decision allowed WAP to receive government funding from a
neutral benefit program and thus mandated that the government
accommodate religious viewpoints. 38 1  In addition, the Court, for
the first time, interpreted the Establishment Clause to permit gov-
ernment funding of proselytization.382
1. Accommodationism as a Guiding Principle
The Court's decision in Rosenberger reflects its acceptance of
accommodationism in adjudicating disputes between church and
State.383 With its determination that an analysis under the Free
Speech Clause-not the Establishment Clause-was dispositive,384
its review of the SAF's guidelines according to a content neutral
standard, 385 and its Establishment Clause analysis, 386 the Court treat-
separationism).
379. Compare Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2521-22 (government may aid a religious
entity through a neutral government program) with Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16 (arguing
for a "wall of separation" between church and State).
380. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2535 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Establishment Clause would not allow the government to support proselytization).
381. See id. at 2521-22 (Opinion of the Court) (holding that when the government
follows neutral criteria the list of recipients can include religious entities); see also supra
part II.D.1 (Court's opinion in Rosenberger); supra part I.A.l.b (discussing
accommodationism).
382. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2513-25; see also supra part II.D.I (discussing
the Court's opinion in Rosenberger); supra part L.A.l.a (examining Establishment Clause
precedent precluding funding for core religious functions).
383. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2513-25; see also supra part II.D.1 (discussing
the Court's opinion in Rosenberger); supra part I.A.l.b (discussing accommodationism).
384. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2524-25.
385. Id. at 2516-17.
386. Id. at 2520-25.
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ed WAP's religious message no differently than secular speech.387
The result is that the government, acting through a neutral entitle-
ment program, may now fund proselytization.8 8
a. Battle of the Clauses
Accommodationists argue that courts should apply the same
standards when the government interacts with either secular or
sectarian organizations.3 9 In Rosenberger, the Supreme Court was
forced to decide between applying the Free Speech Clause and the
Establishment Clause to interpret the SAF's failure to fund WAP. 39°
Under an Establishment Clause analysis, the Court would have
upheld the University's determination if it found Wide Awake's
content to be predominantly religious. 39' This analysis would have
allowed the government to differentiate between religious and non-
religious viewpoints in order to prevent State aid to core sectarian
functions. 392  Under a Free Speech analysis, however, the Court
judged the SAF's refusal to fund WAP under the same criteria used
for non-religious student organizations.393 The Court thus prohibit-
ed the State from differentiating between sectarian and secular
viewpoints and instead held that the government must allocate
funding irrespective of religion .39  The effect of this approach was
that the Free Speech Clause pre-empted the Establishment
Clause.395
387. See id. at 2521-22 (explaining that when the government disburses aid in an
even-handed manner, the list of recipients can include religious entities); see also supra
part II.D.1 (discussing the Court's opinion in Rosenberger); McConnell, supra note 90,
at 188-89 (explaining that the government may aid religion through neutral entitlement
programs).
388. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2521-23.
389. See supra part I.A.l.b (discussing accommodationism).
390. Compare Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2524-25 (Opinion of the Court) (arguing
that the Free Speech Clause is dispositive) with id. at 2533-34 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Establishment Clause is dispositive).
391. See id. at 2534-35 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter examined Wide
Awake's content and found it to be a religious publication. id.
392. See id. at 2534 (Souter, J., dissenting).
393. See id. at 2516 (Opinion of the Court) (The Court refused to determine whether
Wide Awake's message was religious).
394. See id. at 2520.
395. See id. at 2524-25.
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b. Free Speech Analysis
The theory of accommodationism also holds that the public
arena is open to both religious and secular viewpoints.39 In his
dissent, Justice Souter explained that the University did not skew
the campus-wide debate either in favor of or against religion as the
SAF's guidelines prohibited funding for all organizations manifest-
ing a belief in an ultimate deity.397 The Court, however, deter-
mined that the University could not remove religious beliefs from
the forum without skewing the debate.398 Instead, the Court ex-
plained that all secular subjects had corresponding viewpoints
which were both religious and secular. 399 The Court thus rejected
the notion that religion could be removed from the public sphere;
rather, it accepted the accommodationist view that secular and
religious ideas compete equally in the public arena. 4m
c. The Establishment Clause
The theory of accommodationism further allows religious enti-
ties to compete for funding from neutral government programs
equally with their secular counterparts. 4°' The Court held that
funding WAP would not violate the Establishment Clause because
the University did not create the SAF to advance religion or differ-
entiate among sects. 4°2 It reasoned that when the government fol-
lowed neutral criteria and distributed aid in an evenhanded manner,
the list of recipients of government money could include sectarian
403organizations.
The Court's inquiry did not consider the purpose for which the
sectarian institution would use the government money; rather, it
396. See McConnell, supra note 32, at 14 (arguing that religion is an equal actor in
society).
397. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2549-50 (Souter, J., dissenting).
398. See id. at 2518 (opinion of the Court).
399. Id.
400. See id. (holding that inclusion of both religious and secular viewpoints is man-
dated by the Free Speech Clause); see also McConnell, supra note 32, at 14 (arguing that
the public arena should be open to both secular and religious participants).
401. See Howard, supra note 46, at 102.
402. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2522.
403. id.
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focused on the construction and administration of the government
program. Under the Court's analysis, government spending is
prohibited only when the State designed the program to: (1) direct-
ly support a religious entity, or (2) differentiate among religious
sects.4°5 The Court's definition of government neutrality, therefore,
accommodates religious groups by allowing them to receive funds
from neutrally administered government programs.
d. Potential Ramifications
In Rosenberger, the Court applied the Free Speech Clause and
held that the University, by creating the SAF, had assumed an
obligation to fund eligible student organizations without reference
to their viewpoints.4 The question remains, however, whether this
decision represents the ascendancy of accommodationism in Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence, or if the Court's rationale is limited
to the facts of Rosenberger.
. Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Jaffree proclaimed
that government could aid all religions so long as the aid was given
evenhandedly and government refrained from establishing a nation-
al church.4°8 The Court's opinion in Rosenberger allowed the Uni-
versity to fund WAP because the SAF was a neutral entitlement
program.4°9 The next test of the Establishment Clause, however,
could be from a religious organization seeking aid from a federal
entitlement program.n0 In such a case, the religious entity would
404. See id. at 2521-22; see also Bila, supra note 90, at 1549 (explaining that reli-
gious organizations may receive funding from neutral government programs).
405. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2521-22; see also LEVY, supra note 52, at 152
(explaining the limitations that accommodationists place on the aid to religion).
406. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2521-22; see also Bila, supra note 90, at 1549
(explaining that religious organizations may receive funding from neutral government
programs).
407. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2521-22.
408. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also
LEvY, supra note 52, at 152 (interpreting Justice Rehnquist's Jaffree dissent).
409. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2521-22.
410. Cf. Fordham Univ. v. Brown, 856 F. Supp. 684 (D.D.C. 1994). WFUV,
Fordham University's radio station, applied for a federal grant in order to partially under-
write the cost of building a radio tower. Id. at 688. The U.S. Commerce Department
denied the request on the grounds that WFUV broadcasted a two-hour mass every Sunday,
and noted that WFUV would not receive government funding unless it discontinued the
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surely argue that, under Rosenberger, a religious group may receive
funding from a neutral government program.41' Although then-
Associate Justice Rehnquist did not persuade a majority in Jaffree,
the Court might heed his advice and abandon Jefferson's "wall of
separation" between church and State. 1 2
Alternatively, the Rosenberger decision may not constitute an
acceptance of accommodationism. Justice O'Connor provided the
crucial fifth vote in Rosenberger, but rejected the application of
categorical rules when the Establishment and Free Speech Clauses
collide; rather, she explained that a judge must undertake a fact-
specific inquiry to determine whether the program violates the
Establishment Clause.1 3 Under this analysis, a neutral government
program which aided religion could be constitutionally infirm for
a number of reasons, including: (1) the general population had
reason to believe that the government endorsed the religious mes-
sage;414 (2) the organization used the money for an impermissible
purpose; 415 or (3) members of the general population were required
practice. id. at 689-90. The district court upheld the government's determination. Id.
at 705. In December, 1994, however, the Commerce Department reversed its policy and
allowed the grant as Fordham's lawyers prepared an appeal to the district court's decision.
See Thomas J. Lueck, In U.S. Policy Change, Fordham Radio Station to Get Grant, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 21, 1995, at B4. Larry Irving, the administrator of the federal grant program,
explained that the Commerce Department would allow grants if they resulted in "some
attenuated or incidental benefit to sectarian interests." Id. While he conceded that the
policy change would "give grant applicants greater flexibility," he maintained his opposi-
tion to funding stations where religious broadcasting is "the essential thrust of the grant's
purpose." Id.
411. See Rosenberger 115 S. Ct. at 2521-22 (explaining that a religious group may
receive government funding from a neutral government program).
412. See Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 107 (arguing that Jefferson's "wall of separation" is
based on unsupported history and should be abandoned); see also Lupu, supra note 71,
at 238 (explaining that although Justice Rehnquist's Jaffree dissent did not persuade a
majority, accommodationism was growing in strength); cf. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at
2551 (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining his apprehension that "in constitutional adjudica-
tion some steps, which when taken were thought to approach the 'verge,' have become
platform for yet further steps") (citations omitted).
413. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2525-26 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
414. See id. at 2526-27 (explaining that a Wide Awake reader would see the publica-
tion's independence from the University).
415. See id. at 2527 (explaining that the SAF's manner of distribution of the funds
ensured WAP would use government money only for permissible purposes).
[Vol. 6:871
ESTABLISHMENT CLA USE
to underwrite a religious message with which they disagreed. 416 In
addition, while the Court based its Rosenberger decision on an
application of the Free Speech Clause,417 commentators have argued
that the Court might reach a different result in a subsequent Estab-
lishment Clause challenge involving funding to religious schools
instead of speech.4t8 Consequently, accommodationism's hegemo-
ny is unclear.419
2. The Court Misapplied Establishment Clause Precedent
Allowing, for the First Time, Government Funding of
Religious Proselytization
The Court applied the hybrid Free Speech-Establishment Clause
line of cases to find that the University could not deny funding
based on WAP's viewpoint.420 Similarly, the Court noted that
government money could reach religious entities through an inde-
pendent third-party's choice and held that aid to Wide Awake was
permissible because the University paid the printer.421 Underlying
this analysis of precedent, the Court accorded religious organiza-
tions treatment equal to their secular counterparts.422 Consequently,
the Court misapplied the existing case law, and, for the first time,
416. See id. (explaining that an objecting student could challenge the SAF for com-
pelling her to underwrite a religious view with which she disagreed).
417, See id. at 2513 (holding that the Free Speech discussion is dispositive).
418. See Analysis of Supreme Court Decision in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors
of the Univ. of Va. (Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Washington,
D.C.), June 29, 1995 at 2-3. The organization noted:
Rosenberger is a very narrow decision that should cause little harm to Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence. Significantly, the Court majority viewed the
case as involving a free speech controversy, not a religious funding issue. The
majority opinion throughout relies on free speech cases as authority and does
not discuss or distinguish the Court's public funding decisions regarding aid to
religious institutions.
Id.
419. See Viewpoint Discrimination, supra note 3, at 210 ("Although this neutrality
principle will help clarify Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the field remains in disar-
ray .... ").
420. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2516-18 (discussing Lamb's Chapel).
421. Id. at 2523 (explaining that government money never directly reached WAP's
coiffeurs).
422. See McConnell, supra note 90, at 188-89 (explaining that religion should com-
pete equally with its secular counterparts).
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upheld government funding of religious proselytization.423
a. The Hybrid Cases
The Court relied on cases ensuring equal access for religious
organizations both in its Free Speech 424 and Establishment Clause
discussions.425 In its examination of the alleged Free Speech viola-
tion, the Court found that the University's failure to fund WAP
violated the Free Speech Clause.426 It reached this conclusion by
interpreting cases such as Lamb's Chapel in which the Court struck
down regulations denying religious groups access to public facili-
ties.12' The Court held that viewpoint discrimination was imper-
missible both for access and funding as the State must allocate
resources regardless of a recipient's message.428
In both Rosenberger and Lamb's Chapel an instrumentality of
the government rejected an otherwise eligible organization based
on that entity's religious viewpoint.429 The constitutional similari-
ties between the two cases, however, end there: in Lamb's Chapel,
a sectarian organization sought access to public facilities, while in
Rosenberger, a religious group sought funding to publish a jour-
nal.430  The Court nonetheless applied the principles underlying
Lamb's Chapel to Rosenberger and found that the University vio-
lated WAP's members' Free Speech rights.43'
The Court's analysis in Rosenberger over-extended the Lamb's
423. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2533 (Souter, J., dissenting) ('The Court, today,
for the first time, approves direct funding of core religious activities by an arm of the
State.").
424. See id. at 2517-18 (the Court's Free Speech analysis).
425. See id. at 2523-24. (the Court's Establishment Clause analysis).
426. Id. at 2517-18.
427. Id. at 2518 (construing Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2146-49).
428. Id. at 2519-20.
429. See id. at 2519; see also Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2144-45.
430. Compare Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2144-45 (church seeks access to show
religious films) with Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2515 (religious organization seeks govern-
ment funding).
431. Compare Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2147-49 (holding that the school district
discriminated against the Church on the basis of its speech) with Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct.
at 2519 (holding that the University discriminated against WAP on the basis of its
speech).
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Chapel rationale.432 In Lamb's Chapel, the Court interpreted the
Free Speech Clause to require the government to allow religious
groups access to public facilities.433 In Rosenberger, however, the
Court granted financial benefits to religion despite the Establish-
ment Clause's prohibition of direct funding of core religious func-
tions.434 The Court thus accommodated religion by applying the
same analysis to both access and funding for religious organiza-
tions.43 5
The Court's second invocation of the access cases occurred in
its Establishment Clause analysis.436 The Court noted that a school
acts by spending money, and found "no difference in logic or prin-
ciple" between a school operating a facility itself, or paying an
outside contractor to do so. 437 The Court applied this rationale on
the assumption that WAP's members could have used the Universi-
ty's facilities to copy Wide Awake.438  While University policy
allowed CIOs access to facilities such as computer terminals and
meeting rooms, funding was reserved for groups approved by the
Student Council.439 WAP, as a CIO, did not receive University*
funding." 0  Consequently, the Court's decision to underwrite
432. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2550 (Souter, J., dissenting).
433. See Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2146-49.
434. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2546 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that Lamb's
Chapel could not be applied to include funding without "admitting that new economic
benefits are being extended directly to religion in clear violation of the principle barring
direct aid").
435. See McConnell, supra note 90, at 188-89 (explaining that accommodationism
allows religious entities to compete equally with their secular counterparts); see also
Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2146-49 (holding that the school district could not make
decisions about funding based on viewpoint); Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2519 (holding
that the University could not make funding decisions based on viewpoint).
436. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2523-24.
437. Id. at 2524.
438. See id. at 2523-24. The Court compared the University funding WAP to the
Lamb's Chapel school district providing classrooms to a religious organization. Id. at
2523. In Lamb's Chapel, the church would have received access but for the school dis-
trict's improper refusal based on content-discrimination. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at
2146-49. In Rosenberger, however, WAP, as a CIO, was not guaranteed University
funding. See Rosenberger, 795 F. Supp at 177.
439. Rosenberger, 795 F. Supp. at 177.
440. See Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 273. The Student Council, despite denying fund-
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WAP's printing costs elevated WAP's status under University
guidelines from a CIO to a funded organization."'
b. Government Funding Reached Religious Entities
Through Independent Third Parties' Choices
The Court in Rosenberger reasoned that funding the printer
rather than WAP would remove Establishment Clause concerns." 2
This conclusion misapplied Mueller in which the Court held that
independent third parties could give government money to religious
organizations if the donation was a private choice." 3 For Mueller
to apply, the recipient of government funds must: (1) be indepen-
dent of the funded religious entity, and (2) have discretion over the
grant.4"
The Rosenberger Court held that providing funds to the printer
rendered the aid acceptable under the Establishment Clause.445
While the printer was independent of a religious entity, it did not
have discretion to apply University funds to publish another student
organization's work, nor could it make changes in Wide Awake's
content.446 The Court thus rewrote the Mueller line of cases by
removing the word "independent," and held that the government
ing, noted that WAP's CIO status guaranteed full access to University facilities and the
right to distribute issues throughout campus. Id.
441. See Rosenberger, 795 F. Supp. at 177 (a CIO does not receive funding); see
also Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2525 (University must fund WAP).
442. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2523 ("We do not confront a case where, even
under a neutral program that includes nonsectarian recipients, the government is making
direct money payments to an institution or group that is engaged in religious activity.").
443. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 399 (1983); see also supra notes 147-53
and accompanying text (discussing Mueller); Esbeck, supra note 48, at 618 ("Equality is
the operative principle when governmental benefits are directed to all individuals without
regard to religion, who are given complete freedom of choice regarding how they may
'spend' that benefit.") (citation omitted).
444. See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399 (explaining that the Minnesota plan is constitution-
al because the funds reached sectarian institutions through the private choices of parents);
see also Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2544-45 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that correct
application of Mueller would require the printer to exercise discretion).
445. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2523.
446. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2545 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
printer does not have discretion over the grant); see also Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399 (hold-
ing that the program was constitutional because the money reached a sectarian entity as
a result of an independent third party's choice).
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would fulfill its Establishment Clause obligations by directing the
funds to a third party, even if that third party has no discretion in
spending the money." 7
Although WAP's members may never have actually "touched"
the money, the University's funding system allowed them to decide
where to spend the grant." 8 In Mueller, the Court reasoned that
government funding of a sectarian organization was permissible
because the original recipient of funds was independent of govern-
ment and religion. 4 9 In Rosenberger, WAP exercised discretion in
where to spend the government grant.45° WAP, unlike the parents
in Mueller, was a religious organization.451 The Court's misuse of
the Mueller paradigm, therefore, failed to justify government fund-
ing of a religious organization.
c. Direct Funding of a Religious Organization
In Rosenberger, WAP sought University funding to publish a
journal in order to "encourage students to consider what a personal
relationship with Jesus Christ means. 452  In Ball, however, the
Court held that the government could not fund an organization
which would use the money to indoctrinate others into the beliefs
of a religious faith.453  The Establishment Clause, as interpreted
in Ball, thus prohibits WAP's use of government funding for
proselytization.454 Consequently, the Court should have denied the
aid.
447. Compare Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2523 (opinion of the Court) (holding that
government aid was not direct because money went through the printer) with Mueller, 463
U.S. at 399-400 (upholding aid because the parents, an independent entity, directed it to
religion).
448. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2515.
449. See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399-400 (explaining that the parents were independent
third parties).
450. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2515.
451. Compare id. (describing WAP's religious mission) with Mueller, 463 U.S. at
399-400 (parents are independent of religion).
452. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2515 (citation omitted).
453. School Dist. of the City of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397 (1985).
454. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2533 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that the
Court had never before allowed government money to underwrite proselytization); see
also Ball, 473 U.S. at 397 (holding that the government may not fund an organization and
thus substantially advance the sectarian enterprise).
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B. Justice Souter's Dissenting Opinion Ensures an Adequate
Separation of Church and State as Mandated by the
Establishment Clause
Justice Souter's dissenting opinion in Rosenberger correctly
argued that the Court had undermined many of the fundamental
protections guaranteed by the Establishment Clause.455 He would
have allowed government to create a higher "wall of separation"
between religion and society so that religion would be advanced
only due to its ability to draw adherents. 56 He was thus unwilling
to join the Majority's opinion which, he believed, permitted gov-
ernment to underwrite proselytization.457
1. Separationism as a Guiding Principle
Justice Souter's dissent in Rosenberger reflects his acceptance
of separationism in adjudicating disputes between church and
State. 58  Justice Souter's determination that an Establishment
Clause analysis was dispositive, 459 his explanation of the govern-
ment neutrality required towards religion,4 ° and his Free Speech
analysis461 treated WAP's religious speech differently than the
speech of the organization's secular counterparts. 462
a. Battle of the Clauses
Separationists argue that when the government aids a sectarian
organization, the Establishment Clause mandates that courts apply
a different analysis to religious and secular beneficiaries.463 Justice
455. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2533 (Souter, J., dissenting).
456. See id. (arguing that the government cannot underwrite proselytization); see also
TRIBE, supra note 56, at 1160-61 (explaining that voluntarism and separatism combine
to form an ideology that religious advancement would come as a result of its ability to
draw followers without use of government financing).
457. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2535 (Souter, J., dissenting).
458. See id.; see also LEVY, supra note 52, at 151 (explaining that separationism
prohibits government aid to religion).
459. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2533-34 (Souter, J., dissenting).
460. Id. at 2540.
461. Id. at 2547-2551.
462. See id. at 2540 (arguing that even under a neutral program, government could
not fund core religious activity); see also Sullivan, supra note 35, at 212-13 (arguing that
the government may place prohibitions on religious speech which would violate the First
Amendment if applied to non-religious speech).
463. See Sullivan, supra note 35, at 212-13; see also supra part I.A.l.a (discussing
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Souter stated that the Establishment Clause was dispositive in
Rosenberger and explained that an examination of Wide Awake's
contents showed that its authors had devoted the journal to prosely-
tizing. 464 By inspecting the journal's content, Justice Souter did not
analyze Wide Awake under the same criteria used for a secular
journal; instead, he examined the publication to determine whether
it was secular and thus eligible for a government subsidy.465 Jus-
tice Souter thus did what the majority would not do: he scrutinized
Wide Awake for religious content." 6 Justice Souter, therefore,
would have prohibited government sponsorship of proselytization
and ensured that religion advanced solely on its ability to gain
adherents. 47
b. Neutrality
Separationists believe that the Establishment Clause prohibits
government aid, even if impartially and equitably administered, that
supports proselytization.468 In Rosenberger, Justice Souter ex-
plained that the SAF, a neutral government program, could not
fund WAP because of Wide Awake's religious content.469 He rea-
soned that the Establishment Clause prohibited the University from
relying on a program's neutrality to avoid its responsibility of en-
suring that State aid did not subsidize religion.470 Consequently,
Justice Souter's opinion would require WAP to succeed or fail
based on the strength of its message rather than through govern-
ment support. This rationale is similar to the principle Justice
separationism).
464. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2534-35 (Souter, J., dissenting).
465. See id.; see also Sullivan, supra note 35, at 212-13 (arguing that the Establish-
ment Clause mandates a different analysis than a corresponding Free Speech Clause
inquiry).
466. Compare Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2516-17 (opinion of the Court) (holding
that the University may not base funding decisions on a student organization's viewpoint)
with id. at 2535 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the government must not advance
religion).
467. See id. at 2535; see also Cord, supra note 69, at 910 (arguing that religion, as
a matter of conscience, should not receive state funding).
468. LEVY, supra note 52, at 151; see also supra part I.A.l.a (discussing
separationism).
469. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2535 (Souter, J., dissenting).
470. See id.
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Black espoused in Everson.471 Justice Souter's view thus ensures
that religion would remain a private choice for every citizen, there-
by outside the purview of government support.
c. Free Speech Analysis
Separationism requires that the government distinguish religious
viewpoints from their secular counterparts and apportion each into
their respective sphere.472 Justice Souter noted that the SAF's
guidelines eliminated funding for all viewpoints manifesting a be-
lief about religion.473 He reasoned that the University did not dis-
criminate against religion by subsidizing those opposed to religion
while silencing religious advocates; rather, it prohibited funding for
both sides of the debate.474 Underlying this belief are two cotermi-
nous views: (1) an objective observer can cluster religious view-
points and separate them from the secular sphere of debate,475 and
(2) secular subjects do not automatically have a corresponding
religious viewpoint.476 Justice Souter would thus allow the Univer-
sity to subsidize a public sphere for secular viewpoints, but not
underwrite for debates regarding ethereal concerns.477
471. See Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947); see
also supra notes 51-72 (discussing Everson).
472. See Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 57, at 843 ("Distinctions between the
religious and the secular can surely be made; indeed, such distinctions are assumed if the
First Amendment's religion clauses are to have any meaning at all."); see also Teitel,
supra note 55, at 757-58 ("Madison wrote of a world separable into two spheres: the
religious and the secular.").
473. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2549 (Souter, J., dissenting).
474. Id. at 2549-50.
475. See id. (arguing that the SAF guidelines prohibit University support of religious
and anti-religious messages and thus prohibit funding to both sides of the debate); see
also Peck, supra note 45, at 1152 (arguing that the Establishment Clause requires line
drawing to determine proselytization).
476. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2549-50 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
SAF's exclusion of all groups manifesting a belief in an ultimate deity would require the
University to prohibit funding for religious and anti-religious organizations only, thereby
exempting student groups which do not discuss religion).
477. See id. (arguing that it is permissible to prohibit funding to all groups manifest-
ing a belief about religion); see also Esbeck, supra note 48, at 630 (arguing that society
may operate with "exclusive spheres ... for the institutions of church and State. Each
is to operate independent of the other and in its own domain.").
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2. Justice Souter Correctly Applied Establishment Clause
Precedent to Find that Aid to WAP was Impermissible
The controlling principle in Justice Souter's Establishment
Clause analysis was that government could not subsidize a core
religious function. 478 As a result, he argued, the University could
not subsidize WAP.47 9 Justice Souter further noted that WAP's
funding was'not justified by either: (1) the cases in which the
Court applied a hybrid Free Speech-Establishment Clause analy-
sis, 480 or (2) the principle that government can fund religion
through an independent third party's choice.81 Underlying this
analysis was the principle that religion should advance based on its
ability to draw adherents.8 2
a. Direct Funding of a Core Religious Function
Justice Souter began by noting that the Establishment Clause's
primary purpose was to prohibit government subsidization of core
religious functions.483 He concluded that it was impermissible for
the University to support Wide Awake as the journal's purpose was
to proselytize.4s Justice Souter was thus unwilling to allow gov-
ernment to underwrite a religious message; rather, religion would
be advanced by voluntary supporters rather than State support.48 5
b. The Hybrid Cases
The greatest area of disagreement between the majority and
dissent was the applicability of the hybrid line of cases.48 6 Justice
Souter noted that government could not deny a religious entity
access to a neutral forum.4 87 He argued that this analogy ended,
478. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2535 (Souter, J., dissenting).
479. id. at 2547.
480. Id. at 2545-46.
481. Id. at 2540-42.
482. See, e.g., id. at 2535 (prohibiting government aid for proselytizing); see also
Gianella, supra note 56, at 517.
483. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2535 (Souter, J., dissenting).
484. Id. at 2539.
485. See id.; see also TRIBE, supra note 56, at 1160-61 (describing voluntarism).
486. Compare Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2517-18 (opinion of the Court) with id. at
2545-46 (Souter, J., dissenting).
487. Id. at 2545 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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however, when a religious organization sought government fund-
ing.488 He reasoned that the Free Speech Clause mandated that the
government allow religious groups to express their views on a
street comer, while the Establishment Clause prohibited sectarian
organizations from receiving funding. 489 The controlling principle,
therefore, was that the Establishment Clause trumped the Free
Speech Clause for funding issues. Consequently, Justice Souter
held that the University could not subsidize WAP without violating
the prohibition on funding core religious functions.. 9°
c. Funding of Religious Entities through Independent
Third Parties
Justice Souter explained that the Court held in Mueller, Witters,
and Zobrest that an independent third party could aid a religious
organization as the aid was not emanating directly from the govern-
ment.49' This principle, he argued, did not implicate the ban on
government funding because individuals were merely exercising
their First Amendment rights to support a religious organization.492
He distinguished this rationale from Rosenberger on the ground
that the University's printer was not truly an independent third
party; rather, the printer took orders from WAP.493 As a result he
concluded that the aid in question constituted impermissible direct
government support of a religious organization.494
488. Id. at 2545-47.
489. See id. at 2547 (arguing that the street comer analogy does not apply to funding
because it would be extending a new economic benefit to religion despite the prohibition
on direct aid); see also Sullivan, supra note 35, at 209-13 (arguing that the Establishment
Clause's prohibition on funding for religious speech places a limit on the government that
would otherwise violate the Free Speech Clause).
490. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2544 (Souter, J., dissenting).
491. Id. at 2541-42.
492. id.
493. Id. at 2545.
494. Id.
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C. The Court's Decision to Apply the Free Speech Clause's
Content Neutral Doctrine Undermined the Establishment
Clause's Guaranteed Separation of Church and State
The Majority's application of a content neutral Free Speech
analysis is troubling because it undermines the Establishment
Clause's fundamental protections. The Court should adopt an alter-
native test in order to ensure the continued separation of church
and State. One option is to hold that the Establishment Clause
analysis is dispositive in cases where a petitioner employs the Free
Speech Clause to challenge a denial of government funds based on
religious viewpoint. The second option, more specific to
Rosenberger, is to prohibit the government from funding
proselytization through the media.
1. Battle of the Clauses Revisited
The premise underlying Justice O'Connor's concurrence was
correct: Rosenberger stood at the intersection of two First Amend-
ment principles. 495 The Court's decision of which clause to apply
ultimately dictated whether or not it would sustain the SAF's
guidelines.496 Both the district court and the Fourth Circuit held
that the Establishment Clause allowed the University to examine
Wide Awake's content in order to prevent government funding of
proselytization. 497  The Supreme Court, however, applied a Free
Speech Clause analysis which precluded the University from basing
its funding decisions on Wide Awake's viewpoint.498
The reason for the divergent results was the Supreme Court's
application of a content neutral Free Speech analysis.499 The con-
tent neutral doctrine, consistent with its origins in the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, precludes the government from differentiating among
speakers due to their messages.5 00 This test was designed to create
495. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2525 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
496. Compare id. (opinion of the Court) (arguing that "[tihere is no Establishment
Clause violation in the University honoring its duties under the Free Speech Clause") with
id. at 2547 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's decision forcing the Univer-
sity to provide WAP with government funding violated the Establishment Clause).
497. Rosenberger, 795 F. Supp. at 183-84; 18 F.3d at 287-88.
498. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2525.
499. Id. at 2516-17.
500. See id.; see also Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-77 (1971) (holding that the
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a level playing field in the realm of ideas by granting all speakers
the same rights in the forum.501
Religion, however, is a viewpoint unlike its secular counter-
parts'St The government must make distinctions between secular
and sectarian messages and prohibit funding for religious speech.0 3
This process, though it would violate the Free Speech Clause if
applied to non-religious speech, is required by the Establishment
Clause.5° It is therefore inappropriate to include religion in an
analysis which: (1) prohibits the government from differentiating
among speakers based on the content of their message, and (2)
accords all viewpoints equal entitlement to government funds.0
This, however, is exactly what the Court did in Rosenberger.5 6
The Court's decision to apply a content neutral Free Speech Clause
analysis thus eviscerated the Establishment Clause of an indepen-
dent meaning.
Under an Establishment Clause analysis the Court must under-
take a special inquiry if there is a possibility that government fund-
ing could aid a core religious function.5 0 7 This process: (1) allows
the government to differentiate among speakers according to their
viewpoint in order to determine sectarian entities, and (2) precludes
the government from funding religion.50 8 Under this method of
government must treat similarly situated groups similarly and differently situated groups
differently); Size & Britton, supra note 171, at 915-16 (explaining the Equal Protection
origins of content neutrality).
501. See generally Size & Britton, supra note 171, at 914-15.
502. See Greene, supra note 32, at 1616-17.
503. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 14 (holding that the Judge's role is to separate govern-
ment policies which provide for the general welfare from those designed to support
religion); see also Freund, supra note 57, at 843 ("Distinctions between the religious and
the secular surely can be made; indeed, such distinctions are assumed if the First Amend-
ment's Religion Clauses are to have meaning at all.").
504. See Sullivan, supra note 35, at 212-13.
505. See id. (arguing that religion must be treated differently than its secular counter-
parts); see also Size & Britton, supra note 171, at 916-17 (arguing that any attempt to
distinguish speakers based on the content of their speech will be presumptively invalid).
506. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2516-17.
507. See, e.g., Everson, 330 U.S. at 14.
508. See id.; see also Greene, supra note 32, at 1618 ("Barring interpretation of the
term 'religion' risks negating the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses as barriers to
governmental action, for we would have no way of knowing when such action is legiti-
[Vol. 6:871
ESTABLISHMENT CLA USE
adjudication, the Government would fulfill its responsibilities under
the Establishment Clause.
The Court should have decided Rosenberger under the Estab-
lishment Clause. For future cases, the Court should consider: (1)
the philosophy of separationism as espoused in Everson which re-
quires religion to be funded only by its adherents, °5 9 and (2) the
existing case law which precludes the government from funding
core religious functions.5 '0 Under these criteria, the Court would
uphold a program that provides funding to a religious entity so
long as an independent third party donated the aid .5 1 Likewise, the
Court would uphold a government policy that provided a sectarian
organization access to public fora so long as a reasonable observer
would not construe state support of the religious message.5 12 This
test would ensure the separation of church and State.
The difference between Rosenberger and Lamb's Chapel illus-
trates how this model protects the Establishment Clause without
abridging rights under either the Free Speech or Free Exercise
Clause. In Lamb's Chapel, a school district created a general pro-
gram in which private speakers presented their viewpoints in a
public forum.5 3 The risk of a potential Establishment Clause viola-
tion was minimal as the government merely granted the religious
organization access to a public facility. 14 In Rosenberger, howev-
er, the Establishment Clause violation was more palpable: a reli-
gious organization sought to secure government funds to prosely-
tize.515 The Establishment Clause, as interpreted by prior case law,
dictated that a government subsidy to a core religious function was
impermissible. 5 6 The University's act of funding the printer thus
mate and when it is not.").
509. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16.
510. See supra part I.A.2.a (outlining the case law holding that the government may
not subsidize religion).
511. See, e.g., Witters, 474 U.S. at 487 (upholding the program because religion is
funded as a result of the choice of an independent third party).
512. See, e.g., Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2526 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
513. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2144.
514. See id. at 2148.
515. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2515.
516. See, e.g., Ball, 473 U.S. at 381.
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constituted such a violation.
2. The Establishment Clause and the Media
An alternative ground on which the Court could have upheld
the University's determination was by prohibiting government
funding of religious proselytization through the media. Such a
restriction would preserve the Establishment Clause's central policy
of prohibiting direct government funding of religious messages17
It would not allow the government to subsidize sectarian organiza-
tions' process of employing the media to spread their religious
messages.
Under this proposed test, the University's funding of WAP's
printer is impermissible. The aid has the effect of allowing a reli-
gious group to "piggy-back" its message on government money.
In the aftermath of Rosenberger, WAP's members can merely de-
liver Wide Awake to the printer where government funds will subsi-
dize its mass production.1 8 Upon completion, WAP's members
can distribute the paper throughout campus so that students might
read it and be encouraged "to consider what a personal relationship
with Jesus Christ means." ' 9 The journal, like a radio or television
broadcast, is free of charge and easily accessible to all students. 20
The government subsidy thus allows WAP's members to take their
message to the doorstep of all University students and thus consti-
tutes an impermissible advancement of religion.
Government sponsored proselytization through the media vio-
lates two corresponding principles underlying the Establishment
Clause. The first is separationism as delineated in Everson.521 By
allowing WAP to use government funds, the Court has: (1)
brought a religious group's message into the public sphere, and (2)
helped spread the gospel to other parties. The second principle is
voluntarism which holds that the advancement of religion should
517. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 14-15.
518. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2515.
519. Id.
520. Id.
521. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 14-16; see also TRIBE, supra note 56, at 1161 (describ-
ing separationism).
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occur on the basis of an individual's decision to adhere to religious
tenets. 22 By forcing the University to fund WAP, the Court has
ensured that Wide Awake will appear in the public forum so long
as one member of the'group produces and distributes the paper.
This violates the heart of the Establishment Clause, which requires
all religious groups to succeed or fail according to their ability to
draw adherents. 23 Instead, government support of proselytization
through the media impermissibly strengthens religion from public
coffers.
CONCLUSION
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia
represents the continuation of a new trend in the adjudication of
Establishment Clause challenges. The Court's opinion accommo-
dated religion by applying a content neutral Free Speech analysis
which treated religion no differently than its secular counterparts.
The ramifications of this decision are troubling both due to the
majority's application of doctrine and its mistreatment of Estab-
lishment Clause precedent. In dissent, however, Justice Souter
applied the Establishment Clause and argued that subsidizing WAP
would constitute government sponsorship of religious
proselytization. The Court should have adopted Justice Souter's
analysis in order to ensure the vitality of the "wall of separation"
between church and State. The Court's failure to do so has un-
dermined a fundamental protection which has successfully guarded
religious liberty in the United States for over two hundred years.
522. See Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at 778 (noting that voluntarism is the principle
of personal choice).
523. See id.
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